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TO THE EVE OF PRAGUE
Q.. What is the difference between Chamberlain and Hitler?
A. Chamberlain often takes a weekend in the country,
while Hitler often takes a country in a weekend.
--popular Nazi joke
fhal the Munich agreement represented a radical departure from
traditional British policy is today almost a commonplace. Yet, in a
sense, the - of that change had been long previously planted.
To a great degree, Neville Chamberlain was merely reaping tl
1 ginning of a bitter harvest that he, and Stanley I idwi , ' Fore him,
had sown. It is with part of this harvest that this tl ; con-
cern . , yet the events before the occupation of Czechosl are
so vital to any analysis of what followed that a short review seems
e s ', e n t i a 1 .
British foreign policy in the inter-war years has been called
"among the most unsatisfactory in the lone record of the British
government."' A quick glance at the record would tend to confirm
Professor Northedge's comment, Britain had failed to achieve agree-
ment on disarmament, failed to bring Germany into the European balance
F. S. Nor thedge, The Troubl ed Giant: B r i tai n Among the G re a t
Powers, 1.91 6-19 39 (Mew York: Pr'aeger, 1966), p. 617-
L J

' of power as a stable partner, and failed to develop any concepts of
collective security until it was too late for collective security to
be effective against the dynamism of Nazi Germany. Britain seemed to
take tt'^ path of making a decision and then sitting back to wait for the
appropriate consequence to ensue in the international system. Too
often, though, the consequences were anything but appropriate. The
British government "seemed to have a curious knack of waiting until
it hud been maneuvered into humiliating positions from which it was
2forced to extricate itself by decidely clumsy expedients."
Clearly, foreign policy is not a unilateral exercise. Whatever
the right and wrongs of British foreign policy in Europe, it should
not be forgotten that it was played against the ambiti >r, in some
cases, lack of it) of threi jor powers -- Germany, France and
Russia — and a host of smaller ones, most notably Poland and
Czechoslovakia. Thus, the tra ritish policy of a mini n of
interference on the continent consistent with British intei was
diluted b/ the web of intrigue and initiative the European
states and successor states sought to weave. Additionally, with the
advent of the "New Diplomacy", pol icy-f ramers could nc 'one sr ignore
2
W. N. Kedlicctt, British foreign Policy since ' s , 1919 -
1963 (London: Methuen, I968), p. 194.
3Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to
Austen Chamberlain", in Gordon A. Craig and Felix Gilbert, eds..




I public opinion or domestic considerations. I
So, when Chamberlain arrived at Munich, he was -- given the
foregoing and the unprepared condition of the British military — in
a considerably weaker position than, say, Castlereagh at Vienna in
1815. The Prime Minister who had accumulated all the power of policy
making from the Foreign Office could do no more than argue form with
Kitler. Yet for a time that would appear sufficient.
At Munich, Neville Chamberlain could well have reflected upon
his father's words of ^0 years before that, "We have no allies. !
fear we have no friends." France might be counted as partly both,-
although Britain by the mid-Thirti ;s was only beginning to trust I
French, whom they had long suspected of aspiring to Continental hege-
iy. Additionally, France was stricken with internal disorders,
seeming to confirm the English view of that country as in perpetual
chaos. As late as January of 1939, the English and French were still
trying to reconcile themselves, this time on the pages of F orei gn
Affairs. 5
4
J. L. Garvin, The Life of Joseph C hamberlain, Vol Mi: Emp? re
a nd World (London: Macmillan, 193*0 1 P« 282. The incident ^as the
so-called "long-spoon" speech of ^iay 13th, I898, in which Joseph
Chamberlain also said, "We gain all our strength from the confidence
of the people. .. .You must tell tha people what you mean, and where
you are going, if you want them to follow." ( Ibid . )
Harold Nice 1, son, "What France Means to England" and Andre
Geraud, "What England Means to France," Forei gn Affai rs , Vol. 17;
no. 2 (January, 1939), p. 351.
L J

Britain's hostility to Communism made Russia seem, in 1938, a most'
desirable ally. The feeling was reciprocated, each suspecting the
other's interest in any form of collective security to be nothing more
than a ploy to avoid personal responsibility for deterring German
aggress ion.
Italy tempted Chamberlain. He seemed to have a certain fascina-
tion with her
t
especial ly after the idea of Anglo-German talks broke
down in the fall of 1937. At that point, Chamberlain turned to the
idea of Anglo- 1 tal ian talks as a means of isolating Germany. Even as
late as the summer of 1939> Chamberlain considered that peace or at
least the localisation of war night well depend on Italy.
I am thinking of making a further proposal to
Mussolini that he should move for a 12 months'
truce to let the temperature cool down... As
always I regard Rome as the weak end of the
Axis, and we should always be trying to bend
it. 6
Yet it would seem that he was under no illusions as to Italy's rank-
ing as a power.
By a process of elimination, Germany was in the forefront of
possible allies to i>ecwre the European balance of power. Understand-
ing this helps to explain much of the British government's actions
in foreign policy, especially towards Hitler. That Chamberlain under-
estimated Hitler is also today a commonplace, but it seems safe to






I say In this he was in the majority. What Chamberlain sought was an
understanding between the great powers based on the recognition of
7their interests. Securing the interest of the two greatest powers,
Germany and Britain, would provide the foundation for a European
settlement and an enduring peace. As a later chapter will show,
Chamberlain's underestimation of Hitler was not one of stupidity or
s'hort-s ightedness, but rather of an almost blind insistence on ascrib-
ing to Hitler the ambitions that he, Chamberlain, so dear ly hel d.
By 1938, British foreign policy had come to mean the views of
Chamberlain posited against the ambition of Hitler. Not that
Chaml I iii had come to guide Bi itish foreign policy by accident. in
reality he had made no secret of his desires to be at one Prime
Minister and Framer of foreign policy. In a November, 1938 diary
entry, perhaps elated by Munich, he wrote:
In the past, I have often felt a sense of helpless
exasperation at the way things have been allowed
to drift in foreign affairs, but now I am in a
position to keep them on the move, and while I
am P.M., I don't mean to go to sieep.
In his desire to control foreign policy he was not particularly in-
novative. The shift in policy making from Whitehall to Number 10
Downing had begun with Lloyd George and the advent of the "Mew
7
No rt hedge, Troubled Gia nt, p. 481
8





I Diplomacy." Chamberlain, with a mandate and complete control of his
party, merely acce ' r I the shift one'- i it nearly complete,
consequence was a British diplomacy that to be characterized by
dangerous defects of coordination as well as a high degree of amateur-
ishness, imprecision, and feckless opportunity." Diplomacy being
the vehicle of foreign policy, it takes little to assume that the
formulation of policy must have been in about the same stage of dis-
repai r.
Within a year of becoming Prime Minister, Chamberlain had almost
complete control of major foreign policy had sur-
round d hi if with lil Ivisors -~ Hoare, Hal if; on
d Wilson •--- and replaced several ambassadors with ones more pliant:
to his wisl s. Although Foiling held that "any notion that he
[Ch in] aimed at capturing one key position af'or another [in
the Foreign Office] is baseless," it is hard to !oc ! ; at the record
and think otherwise. By the time of Anschluss, Chamberlain suppoi
were in all important decision-making areas and in key embassies.
More importantly, the opposition was not only out of cabinet, but
almost out of earshot. Eden was on a back bench, Churchill lo I
enough but unliked and Vansittart in a mostly ceremonial foreign
office job.







Yet if Chamberlain could dislodge personalities, he had to face '
higher realities in attempting to change the direction of foreign
policy. Tradition had dictated that Britain's search for security—
-
the aim of any foreign policy— could be most successful in attempt-
ing to seek equilibrium in Europe at the least cost to British inter-
ests. After World War I, the British sought to revive, knowingly
o'r unknowingly, the Concert of Europe.
Britain felt that by encouraging the powers to accept a sta l
gyp suitably modified to remove the worst errors of the peace treat!
several goals could be gained. First among these, the powers could
avoid turning Europe into armed, divided camp?. This done, a vigors
effort to achieve the disarmament essential to economic recovery could
be made;. Finally, acceptance of a status q u o would allow Britain the
1 ifreedom to again concentrate on her Empire.
In taking this course, Britain was acting in a tradition anchoi
in the Congress of Vienna and beyond. In 1815, Castlereagh had belie
British security could best be obtained in both general and specific
terms. "In general, he [Castlereagh] believed in a system of a 'just
equilibrium' or balance of power upon the Continent, and it is this
belief which explains the. immense efforts he devoted to the settle-
ment of the Polish and Italian problems, neither of which could be







1 described as a direct British interest. ' '
By the early 20th century, traditional British foreign policy
could best be summed up in the words of Sir Eyre Crowe. At the begin-
ning of the N ..- V' ar in 1 907 , Crowe wrote:
The equilibrium establ i shed. . . i s technically kno
as the balance of power, and it has become almost a
historical truism to i tify England's secular
policy with the maintenance of this balance by
throwing their weight now in this scale and none in
that, but ever on the side opposed to the political
dictatorship of the strongest state or group at a
g Iven t ime. 13
Hitler of course, could only gain by appeasement. He had upset
traditional British policy so far in two distinct ways. First, h
unwilling to accept partnership in a stable European Concert. This
s so bece'i his easy successes in striking o r~f sstrictions
of Versailles had earned him a widespread following, especially among
1^
the German lower middle and farm classes. i he mass of public opinion
being either for or --• as important -- not against his policies, he
12
Harold Hi col son, The Cong res? of Vienna (New York: Harcourt,
Brace, 19^6), P- 205. Poland wouid still be a problem for Chamberlain,
Castlereagh would no doubt ! ive been shocked to hear Czechoslovakia
described as: "...a faraway country [with] people of whom we know
nothing." (Foiling, Chamberlain, p. 372).
1 3As quoted in Frank Ashton-Gwatki n, The British Foreign
Service (Syracuse: Syracuse Univ. Press, 1950), p. 83.
Hajo Hoi born, The Political Collapse of Europe (Hew York:
Knopf, 1951), p. 147-
L J

' could ad with more latitude than a British Prime Ministei
Second, in the reaction of the other two leading powers —
France and Italy -- Britain found herself between two equally unaccept-
able policies. On the one hand, Britain could have placed herself
"...alongside France and Italy in resistance to the German revival;
this would have meant acceptance of 'partial alliances' almost
15
unanimously condemned by British opinion." ' Indeed, by doing so




i a t ion of the Great Powers. On the other hand, Britain could
attempt to satisfy Hitler with timely concessions in hopes of one day
satiating him and coercing him to accept his place in the British
concept of the European Concert. It was this seemingly unacceptable
policy that became: the framework of appeasement. Once ii ..nted by
the Chamberlain government, "there was hardly a point short of total
16humiliation towards which this course led."
Thus, when Chamberlain took office, he inherited a leng-pract icedj
traditional British foreign policy of a minimum interference, on the
Continent linked with the desire to "maintain a just equilibrium. But
he inherited it at a time when Hitler's actions or threats were call-








' and skill to move in a new direction in foi i policy and chose to do '
so. But until Munich he did not abandon the traditional policy. In-
deed a case could be made that appeasement was an attempt to contin;:




It was not Chamberlain who invented appeasement. Briand had some
years before coined it as something possible and desirable. Given
the mood of the Thirties in which the bulk of educated opinion felt
that war was an ultimate evil whose avoidance was worth any price,
appeasement seemed logical and justifiable. Chamberlain was the most
dedicated practitioner of appeasement and as such is most identh i
With its failing. But it must be remembered that, until shortly after
Munich, he was reading public opinion only too correctly, . Id
have any politician of his acumen. His miscalculation was not in
espousing appeasement but in clinging to it in spite of oven. /he lining
1
8
evidence that it was not accomplishing the purpose he had in view.
Indeed if one is to believe most accounts -- including Mi . 1 ylor's
19
-- appeasement was a reasonable and sane policy. To Chamberlain,
17
Raymond Sontag, A Broken World, Vol. 19 of The Ri se of Modern
Europe, sd. by William Langer (New YorK: Harpers, 1970, P- 31*+.
1 8
William R. Rock, Neville C hamberlain (New York: Twavne,
1969), p. 212.
19
A. .}, P. Taylor, The Qrin ns f V'o r i r| War Two (New York:
Atheneum, 19&1 ), p. 135- Also Rock, Chamberlain , p. 115 and





' appeasement meant -- if one can evoke a precise definition -- the '
making of timely concessions to disgruntled powers in a hope that
concessions would conciliate, calm and restore order. International
tension could hu reduced by a methodical removal of the principal
20
causes of friction among nations. On paper it was an eminently
workable idea; in reality it could not be challenged until it failed.
And it was not until the aftermath of Munich that it bee." imewhat
obvious that it was failing. Then and only then could opposition •
appeasement coalesce.
To Chamberlain's credit, he put an end to Baldwin's sceptical,
easy-g policy of drift. He set out to implement his policies in
a dynamic and forthright manner. In the words of Raymond Son tag, "H
moved without doubt or hes; n. Opposition at home he treated with
impatience which quickly changed to contempt, whether the opposition
came from the Labor Party from dissidents in his own party, like
Churchill, or from the Foreign Office."
The opposition, on the other hand, suffered from lack of cohesive-
ness or organization. More important, it lacked factual evidence to











' if appeas n hadn't I i tested, it also had not failed and the
probabilities of its success or failure rested in a largely unpredict-
able future. Thus the opposition to appeasement was only in principle,
a weak argument given Chamberlain's popularity and tight rein of party
and Foreign Office. William Rock points out that a section of the
British press opinion was consistently sceptical of Chamberlain's
foi - policies, but the papers cited are those that were of lesser
22importance, regional press and the like. In the final analysis,
opposition to appeasement, to late 1933 was scattered and ineffectual
with the majority of Englishmen preferring almost anything to war.
William Rock's arguments that opposition >re important than pre-
viously realized seem to go to ground on his inabi i o cite proof
of the el s oi the o| >. • ition en C ! i i lain. That Prague changed
policy c vindicated the opposition is one thing, but the changes
in British foreign policy came as a result, in this instance, of
23
external rather than internal pressures.
22
William R. Rock, Appe asement on Tt inl ([Hamden, Conn.]:




p. IX. For a thorough study of Conservative
Opposition to Appeasement, see Neville Thompson, The A nt i -Apoeasers
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1970- Mr. Thompson calls Conservative discontent
"sporadic nd discontinuous" and nade up of "individual critics and
small cliques, but no cohesive graup." This hardly provided the
framework to force change upon th» politically secure Chamberlain.




' In 1938 Chamberlain's foreign policy moved from theory to
practice. The resignation of Anthony Eden and Anschluss marked the
first half of the year. These tv/o events were played out, almost
simultaneously, against the backdrop of steadily deteriorating German-
Czech relations in regard to the Sudeten question.
Whether or not Chamberlain was bent on removing Eden is a stili
2k
unresolved question. It one accepts the idea that "as early as
1S36 [Chamberlain] seems to have reached a decision to secure for
himself a dominant position in the formulation of British policy," '
then the eventual removal of Eden would seem almost inevitable. Yet
it appears that Chamberlain was aware of Eden's • ind, as
skillful politician, the former would not have driven him out of the
government on a trivial issue. Also, the two men were clc on 1 »st
2k
That Chamberlain actively sought to force Eden's resignation
is discussed in Rock, Appeasement
,
p. 20 arid Margaret George, The
Warped Vision: Bri tish Fo reig n Po licy 1933 - 1939 (Pittsburgh: Univ.
of Pittsburgh Press, 1965), p. 176. Thompson, The Anti -Appeasers ,
p. ]k0 and Northedge, Gian t, p. ^88, feel ilia is s forced on
both sides. Feiling, Chamber! a in , sheds little light on the question
Thompson has a lucid chapter in Ant i -Appeasers that skillfully probes
the differences between Chamberlain and Eden (pp. 13^-155).
*"> r
Marion L. Kenney, "The Rcle of the House of Commons in
British Foreign Policy during the 1937-1938 Session.", in Nor ton
Downs^ed., Essays in Hon o r o f Coryers Read (Chicago: Univ. of
Chicago Press, 1953;, p- 138. Kenney also takes the line that
Chamberlain sought to exclude the House of Commons from debating
Foreign Policy questions as part of his policy to concentrate




• issues than later events would have us believe. But conjecture asid:
the fact that remains is that at the first real test of Chamberlain's
policy, the Anschluss, effective opposition no longer existed within
the gov n nt, Eden had gone, the split forced on both sides rather
of
than d iped as part of a Chamberlain master plan," and Chamberlain
now had a totally free hand in the execution of his policies.
Eden even refrained from attacking Chamberlain's policies in
his res 'gnat ion speech. In part this was due to the confidential
27
natui he question over which the t n split* and in part it
was due rty I yalty. ToOj it might have been in his mind tha
his resignation might bring a government collapse and his own call
to the Prime Ministry. In that case he would not h< poken out
for fear o? losing his place in the queue. Whatever the , his
Parliament speech on the 21st of April, 1938, was a whimper rather
than tha expected bang. In the words of Harold Nicolson, it was,
"too restrained in parts and then too unrestrained. Either he should
have confined himself to the distressed colleague poi nt-of-v iew or
launched into an appeal for decency. in foreign policy. He fell
between two stools.""
9f






p. 22-31 offers a good synposis.
28
Nigel N i co 1 s on , ed
.
, Haro ld Nicols or: Di aries and Letters
,




Although Eden did not start a back-bench revolt, he at least
opened the way for more criticism of appeasement in Commons. By and
large, though, the average Conservative M.P. was less concerned about
the principles at stake than about the possibility of losing their
its in the possible election that the cabinet crisis had momentarily
posed. The majority obeyed instructions to ra liy behind the govern-




Hard on the heels of Eden's resignation came Anschluss. Hitler
had rightly guessed that the omens were favorable for Germany's move
to annex Austria. Many Britons, suffering an excess of conscience
over the inequities of Versailles, thought the Austro-Gei in union
not o'-: ]ical but moral. In the mid-thirties, Austria's external
proted had faded away and the most she could count on were
British, French, Hungarian and Italian agreements to consult if her
integrity was endangered. Austrians themselves had not overcome




* Christopher Thome, The Approach of War, 1 938-39 (New York:
St. Martins Press, 1968), p. 37-

16
The struggle and events surrounding Anschluss are ably record-
ed.
31 Over the night of March 11-12, 1938, the first coup d'etat by
telephone was accomplished, with Goering orchestrating events from
Berlin. The British reaction was a protest note, "His Majesty's
Gover; n nl feel bound to register protest in the strongest terms
against such use of coercion, backed by force, against an i dependent
S'tate, in order to create a situation incompatible with its national
32independence." " Thin gruel indeed, and doubly so when one considers
that within hours of the 9 a.m. dispatch of the protest, Ribbentrop
was the guest of honor at a luncheon at the Prime Minister's Downing
St. residence.
British reaction seemed as improvised as the Anschluss. At
first, the I . itish government cast around for explanations Chamberlain
wrote, "It is tragic to think that very possibly this mi iave been
prevented if I had had Halifax at the Foreign Office instead of Anthony
3
1
' To cite but a few sources: Survey of International Affairs,
1938, Vol 1, pp. 179-256; Northedge, Troubled G'ia nt, pp. 489-36;
Rock, Appeasement
,
pp. 46-65 and Chamberlain, pp. 129-32; Medlicott,
Br i t ish For. Pol
.
, pp. 173-7 as well as P. A. Reynolds, B ritish
Fo reign Policy in the lnter--V/ar Years (London: Longmans, 1954),
pp. 130-51.
32
Great Britain, Foreign Office, Documen ts on British Foreig n
Pol i cy, Third Series, Vol 1, no. 39, 12 March 1938. (Hereinafter
referred to as D . B. F . PiV with document number and date, as all




I at the time I . ; er to Mussolini."" Later, speaking in I
Parliament, he refuted statements that Britain had given her assent
to Germany to absorb Austria into the Reich. (Though he did not
3Z4.
speculate on the effects of Britain's lack of opposition).
onChamberlain admitted that Anschluss caused "a damaging effect U p
35
general confidence in Europe."" But he went on to say that one must
fece facts and:
The hard fact is... that nothing could have
arrested this action by Germany unless we
and others with us had been prepared to use
force to prevent it. 3°
Chamberlain closed by saying that the government had decided en a
fresh review of defense policy. But the hour was late and the
vacillations of British policy-makers only encouraged Hitler. The




Feiiing, Chamber la in, p. 3^2.
Great Britain, Parliament, Parliamentary Debates (Ho-ise of
Commons), 5th ser., Vol. 333, col. 5-1. (Hereinafter referred to as
Par 1 . Debates wi th volume and column numbers).





I British reaction, at first noisy, quickly subsided. Except
among th I ian ntary Opposition and some sections of the press,
most could somehow find refuge in Neurath's statement that the, "...
form of relations between the Reich and Austria can only be regarded
as an internal affair of the German pei which is no concern of the
•30
Third Powers." In any event, the presentation of a Nazi fait accompl
i
1
in Austria destroyed what was left of British intentions towards
f i mines s .
The press was more antagonistic, both towards Germany and
Chamberlain's foreign policy. The normally pro-government Sunday Time s
que :
'
nment policy and suggested, of all things.
39possibility of return to collective security. !f one is to believe
Rock's analysis, there was a widespread press groundswel
1
return to collective security, together with suggestions that the
government should support Czechoslovakia against future German aggres-
s 1 on
.
Yet, for all the commotion, for all the debate in Parliament,
the question of Anschluss was soon overtaken by events in the Sudeten








Vol. 1, no. 56, 12 March 1938.
39








I face of n is, it became easier to rationalize away the absorption '
of Austria into Greater Germany. Winston Churchill accurately
captured the tenor of British opinion when, speaking in Commons on
the 24th of March, he said:
My right hon Friend the Prime Minister will
perhaps repeat what he said a few weeks ago
that the tension in Europe is greatly re-
laxed. The Times will write a leading
article to say how silly those people
look on the morrow of the Austrian incorporation
who raised a clamour for exceptional action
in foreign policy and home defense and how
wise the government were not to let th
selves be carried away by this passing
incident. '
But, as Hitler became more sel f-confident , "statesmen el: re
began to doubt [his] good faith. Even those who still hoped to appease
him began to think also of iesi stance. !"he uneasy balan i I ted,
hithough only slightly, away from peace and towards war."
In the days that followed Anschluss and Eden's exit, appeasement,
became the leading edge of British foreign policy. In Central Europe,
Germany continued to menace Czechoslovakia. Throughout the uncertain
spring of 1938, the steady escalation of the Sudeten problem brought
Britain closer to war while dimming hopes of reconstructing a just
41
Pari. Debate s, Vol. 333, col. 1453-









1 equilibrium in Lurope. The descent to Munich and Prague had begun. '
Goering gave fulsome assurances to all who would listen that
Germany desired nothing more than to improve relations with
choslovakia. In spite of this., it seemed almost pat-
obvious that the now nearly-encircled successor stale was next on
the list of Nazi aggression. On the 15th of March, the British
charge at Prague, Mr. Newton, saw Germany 1 : "next item on their
program" to be Czechoslovakia. Although it appears his persona]
sympathies i . i th the Czechs, the chai I :. due I
Czechoslovakia's geographical position, her history 2 racial
divisions, her presen itical situation a| d untenable and
for Britain, "it would be no kind ;ess in the long run to to
maintain, her in it." He went on to say that if changes were to be
made in Czechoslovakia, they should be done while favorable conditions
obtained.
z+3
In addition to those sources mentioned in footnote 31, the
following are of interest in tracing the events surrounding
Berchtesgaden/Godesburg/Mun ich: Wheeler-Ben net
,
Munich: Pro ogue to
Tragedy ; S urvey of inte rnational Affairs, I S'38, Vol , : and Feiling,
Chamber la i ,- i
, pp. 3^7.382.
D.B.F.P. , Vol. 1, no. b3, 12 March 1938. Goring, with his
usual pompousness, had assured the Czech minister in Berlin by saying,
"Ich gebe I hnen mein Ehrenwort" (I give my word of honor), a state-
ment that could well be in the running for bankrupt promise of the
century .
PD.3.F.P. , Vol. 1, no. 87, 15 March 1938.

21
F Chamberlain had, as early as November of 1937. thought a good
way to bar i th the Germans was to say: "...give us satisfactory
assuraru I it you won't use force to deal with the Austrians and
Czechoslovak! ans and we will give you similar assurances th won't
use force to prevent the changes you want, if you can get them by
peaceful means."' By early March, 1938, Chamberlain had abando:
any ideas of giving guarantees to Czechoslovakia, or for that matter,
the French in connection with any obligations to the Czechs.
In mid-May, British policy could be summarized as seeking to
preserve peace by restraining France and Czechoslovakia, ignoring
48
Russia and accommodating I ny. Chamberlain continued co view
the problem as one of Sudeten demands, while for Hitler the Sudeti
id was merely a talking [joint. For the Fuhrer the real
crush Czechoslovakia and gain control of her resources and strategic
position. Still it would be unfair to say that Chamberlain did not
recognize the ramifications of the Sudeten question. That he chose mo-
mentarily to ignore them was due in great part to a renewal of interest
ir, the Mediterranean. His attention was drawn back to Central Europe
46







Charles L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars (Chicago:




l~only as the Anglo- Italian talks and debates over Britain's role in tl
Spanish Civil War wound do.
When he did turn to the Czech question, it seems apparent that
he felt appeasement to be a still untested idea. Czechoslovakia
offered an ideal testing ground, especially as his attitude finally
came to rest on a belief that the stakes in Czechoslovakia wore not
Sufficiently high to warrant the horrors of war. The Newton telegram
referred to above offered an opening towards a view that war for the
sake of something that was unviable in peace was foolish and futile.
In an of f-the-record press interview in early April, Chamberlain came
to the logical conclusion of his reasoning: Britain wou
for Czechoslovakia.
r 1
The May crisis offered proof of this. ' 1 began by taking
a strong line towards the threat of a Nazi coup in Czechoslovakia. He
told Ribbentrop "...not to count upon this country being able to
stand aside if from any precipitate action there should start a
k9
Rock, Chamber lain, pp. 133-7-
The May crisis began on May 19th, 1938, when reports of
German troop movements, followed :>y a border incident in which two
Sudeten Germans were shot, aroused fears of a putsch in Czechoslovakia,
The Czech government ordered a partial mobilization. For a brief
moment, it appeared that Britain, France and Russia were ready to
act to protect Czechoslovakia.
51





The Foreign Secretary's . tion caught both Hitler and Chamberlain
by surprise. Hitler backed down. But in the long run this was so
much the worse for the C s< h: . Operation Green was summarily redrafted
to include a statement vowing Hitler's "...unalterable intention to
r o
smash Czechoslovak! a by military action in the near future."
Chamberlain, too, backed down from Halifax's statement, persisting in
his belief that appeasement would satiate Hitler in the long run. In
abandoning the idea of a guaranl 2 to Czechoslovakia. Chamberlain
sought an alternative. Nevi 1 Henderson, from Berlin, thought that,
"Prevention is better than cure and I ho ly believe th
'
moment has come for Prague to get a real twist of the sen
Within a few days, the twisting ' I gun. Halifax fi th
Chamberlain's approval floated the idea of sending a British observer
into the Sudeteniand to report directly on the situation. Almost
s imu 1 taneous ly , Hitler was meeting with his advisors in Munich, where
55
a decision to avoid a coup was made. As the threat seemed to fade,
the united front, that had risen against Germany rapidly dissipated.
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iThe net resull confirmation of Czechoslovakia's isolation.
In the final analysis, it is, as J. W. Wheelei net points
out, of secondary importance as to whether the Germans actually
intended to invade Czechoslovakia or not. The point is that the
rest of Europe believed that the Nazis harboured such intentions.^
British reaction had been for once, nearly unequivocal and, to the
ou side observer, it could appear that the anti-Nazi forces might
have begun to lay the bases for a, "...rudimentary and emergency form
of collective security." As with all other British initiatives,
this firm line towards Germany quickly dissipated in the face of
Chamberlain's continued advocacy of appeasement. /• seen,
he settled for the sending of a mediator when bilat. i :?ch~Sudeten
talks collapsed in mid-July without resolving what was clearly an
explosive situation. At this point the Sudeten question again
emerged from being an internal Czech problem into the question of
wider European politics.
The announcement of the Rune i man mission was made to Commons
during the last debate on foreign policy in the session, October 3>
58
1938. Lord Runciir.an was to be a mediator, who would try to acquaint
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rTiirnself with all the facts and the of both sides and to, "...
perhaps later on... make some proposal s .. .wh i ch will help them."
Chamberlain envisioned no solutions from the Runciman mission,
but rather hoped that it \ d result in informing public opinion
nd hopefully making seemingly intractable issues less so. It was
not a high goal to say the least. Yet in the solution of the Czech
p'roblem lay the future of appeasement:
If only we could find some peaceful solution of
this Czechoslovakia question, I should myself
I tl h ' was open again for a further
effort for a general appeasement --an appease-
i ant which cannot be obtained until we con be
satisfied that no major cause of difference
or dispute remain , unsett led. bU
In the end, even the modest goal of the Runciman mission \ not to
be achieved. Four settlement plans gained four rejections. By tl
end c t, Runciman was discouraged and. at the same time, aware
of the drift towards war. The Czechs would give up to the point
that they felt their notional security and integrity were threatened,
while this appeared to be the point where the Sudeten Germans wished
to begin bargaining. Agrcund, the Runciman mission marked time until
59 Par1. Debates , Vol. 338, col. 2958.
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As the crisis deepened, Chamberlain found his foreign policy
repeatedly called into question by the press and the Opposition.
Public opinion seemed to move against surrender. On the other hand,
Chamberlain had long been aware of British military deficiencies.
While some improvements in rearmament had been made, they were modest
ones. Chamberlain still relied on the opinion given by the Chiefs
of Staff in the Spring that war with Germany over Czechoslovakia
must be avoided at all costs until rearmament had gotten further along.
stage was set for the last attempts, this time by
pei
;
nacy, to appease Nazi dynamism. Chamberlain had thought
of an expedient "so unconventional and daring that it rather took
Halifax's breath away." He would sec Hitler face to face.
Chamberlain's three September journeys to see Hitler mark the
high-water of appeasement. Numerous accounts, for and against, good
and bad, are available. It remains here to touch at the highlights
in an attempt to show how Chamberlain clung to appeasement in the
face of reality and how, gradua 1 ly , . oppos i t ion to government policies
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I coalesced during t he Munich Winter of 1938-39.
Reading the Foreign Offi dispatches that cover the period or
September the 13th and l^fth, it is difficult not to become infected
with optimism. Only in Paris was there some displeasure: H. Daladi.
had hoped for conversations "a trois", claiming that it had been
suggested to him several times to meet with Hitler but that he had
always refused as he had felt a British representative should be
65
present. In spite of French absence, from all reports the meet!
with Hitler at Berchtesgaden was friendly and more successful than
66
either had expected. Chamberlain was accompanied by Sir horace
Wil c md not by any Foreign Office representatives. The meeting
lasted about three hours. As it developed, Chamberlain found himself,
knowingly or otl rwi < ast as the representati - reign
•r negotiating the fate of another sovereign power. After listen-
ing to a long monologue by Hitler, (and noting that the Chancellor
did not exhibit any traces of insanity), Chamberlain sought to draw
Hitler out on the Sudeten question:
So I said, 'Hold on a minute; there is one point
on which I want to be clear... you say that the
three million Sudeten Germans must be included
5D.B.F.P. , Vol. 2, no. 883, 14 September 1938,





in the Re i c Id you be satisfied with that
and is there nothing more that you want'.°7
Hitler responded that all
I
nted were Sudeten Germans and
that he had no desire to dismember the Czech nation. He said that
if the British were prepared to accept the idea of Sudeten self-
determini tion, Hitler was prepared to talk. Chamberlain, by his own
recollection "...didn't care two hoots whether the Sudetens were in
j
the Reich or out of it, but i saw immense practical difficulties
in a pleb i sc i te,
meeting completed, Chamberlain hurried back to London and
pro lied the Cabinet together. He sought their approval as
•
' 1 < hat of Lord Runciman and the French to a plan i '. ten
secession. As to the Czechs, they hadn't been con ill so why
spoil a perfect record? The Cabinet and Runciman yielded easily,
the French less so, but in the long run, no less definitely,
advice given to the Czechs was to avoid a plebiscite, but to cede
those i as containing 50 per cent or more German population. But on
the British side a remarkable concession was made: Britain agreed to
join in a guarantee of what remained of Czechoslovakia after the
secession of the Sudeten areas. This action marked the first
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I reversal of Britain's consistent refusal to be committed in Central
and Eastern Europe. In the light of events the following spring, it
takes on considerable significance. The action was not devoid of
irony: having failed to assist Czechoslovakia when she was a formidable
ally, Britain now sought to guarant; when she was a helpless
nat i on.
The Czechs, for their part, questioned the Russians and the
French as to whether they would honor their pledges. The Russians
replied in the affirmative on the 20th. During the same evening,
71
the Czech government refused the Anglo-French proposals. I hey felt
the proposal would not realize the object ace. They further




laced in every respect."'
Within the. hour, though, another cable arrived from Mr. Newton,
the minister at Prague, that the Czech reply should not be regarded
as final. Newton felt that, "If I can deliver a kind of ultimatum
Thorne, Appro ach of War
,
p. 75- Russian assurances, operative
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on to say that the question of frontiers could not be decided without
Par 1 iamentary consu 1 tat ion and that the Anglo-French proposal would
not, in reality, solve the minority problem while it would trost









In view of Newton's dispatch (and a similar exchange between the
French ambassador and his government), an Anglo-French demarche was
made to President Benes at 2 a.m. on September 21st. Both ambassadors
urged Benes to reconsider the Anglo-French proposals. Benes at first
demurred, but gradually it seemed to sink in on him that he was
receiving an ultimatum. He said as much to the Ambassadors, who
replied that it was an ultimatum in the sense "that it represented
final advice of our government (s) and in their view the last possible
moment for acceptance of their advice, if this country was to be
Ik
saved ."
At mid-day on the 21st, the Czech government accepted, uncondi-
tio: he Anglo-French proposals. Chamberlain then went to
Godesbor^ -o again consult with Hitler. Chamberlain had gained Hitler's
objective for him yet found to his utter surprise that the ante had
been upped. Hitler now demanded the immediate occupation of the
Sudeten regions by German troops, an act that would clearly lead to
hostilities and bring the Franco-Czech alliance into force, leading
73D.B.F.P.
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'to a European war. tier had been deprived of a military victory
and his disappointment was obvious. In the conversations with
Chamberlain, the Chancellor vented his pique in a variety of ways.
After the usual exchange of niceties, Hitler proceeded to lead
Chamberlain down the primrose path. Hitler pictured 120,000 refugees
had the opposition of the English to Germany's vital interests.
Chamberlain countered with worries about public opinion. At this
point, Ribbentrop; who had been handed a message, "...announced in a
77
pori. e that M. Benes had ordered general mobi 1 izat i or i."
Hit; t in that event things were settled. Briefly disp!
ing anger, Chamberlain asked who had mobilized first? A; i hearing
Hitler say Czechoslovakia, Chamberlain retorted that Germany had
mobilized first. "Hitler replied that when mobi 1 izat ii ordered...
Mr. Chamberlain would see the difference between the peace and war
75Medlicott, Briti sh For. Pol
.
,
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that Hitler's actios were merely to buy time. He feels that
Hitler saw C?.echos lovaki a breaking to pieces. When that happened,
Germany could then play a role as a peacemaker, rather than being
the creator of a new order. (Origins of WW II , p. 173). In view of
the multitude of Foreign Office dispatches detailing German mil it.
preparations against Czechoslovakia, Taylor seems to have flown in
the face of real i ty.
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1 strength of the German army."' '
Further on, Chamberlain protested that the German memorandum
appeared more like an ultimatum. Hitler noted that the paper car:
the heading "memorandum". Chomberlain said he was mor I in
the contents than the title. And so it went. With the underlying
issue of the future of Czechoslovakia already decided, the two men
i
quibbled over details. At Godesberg, as before at Berchtesgaden and
later at Munich, the Czech question was not debated so much as the
methods of dismemberment. Hitler had ascertained early on ;;
Czechoslovakia was alone; he could have what he wanted, when he wanted
' in the manner he wanted. !t seems he probably pref a bl<
less military occupation, showing power on the cheap. A
,
: cal
solution could not guarantee firm Nazi control, only occupation would
do this. Thus the military role was cast.
I inich, for all that has been written, seems almost a footnote
to Berchtesgaden and Godesberg. Again orchestrated by Hitler with
Mussolini as concertmaster , Hitler gained what he wanted. In the
interim between Godesberg and the Munich Conference, war seemed
always but hours away. The British government made an attempt to so
sound out the Russian position, held talks with the French and quietly









irlain sent Sir Horace Wilson to talk with Hitler. Wilson manag
to see Hitler shortly before the Chancellor was scheduled to address
a huge rally at Berlin's Sportpalast . There was no polite talk to
begin; indeed Hitler began by saying that there was no use in talking
at all. Sir Horace persisted, but Hitler left little room for discus-
sion and Wilson left with Hitler's epithets — so bad, we are told,
79
t'hat they "could not be repeated in a drawing room" -- ringing in
his ears.
At about the same time in London, Lord Halifax issued a pr<
imunique stating that in the event of a German attack on Czechoslovakia,
France would be bound to come to Czech as< and Great Sri tain
80
and Russia would certainly stand by France. Yet the d as not
yet completely shut. Even portpalast speech, H i 1 - did not
go beyond demanding the Sudetenland by October 1st. He left it to
Chamberlain to decide whether to continue his efforts to get the
81
Prague government to go along. This was enough for Chamberlain,
Again he sought a solution in personal diplomacy, but this time it
was in quadrilateral talks. The conference at Munich had all the
73D.B.F.P..
,




Vol. 2, no. 1111, 26 September 1938, (Footnote 1).
81







'organization of a kindergartei ing. What did emerge was, stripped
of frills, an affii ion of the Godesberg i ndum, except that
occupation would take place in stages rather than one fell swoop.
Admittedly, it was a more tasteful do ument, but ag.'in none-the-less
definite. As before, Czechoslovakia was not represented. The Briti
and French had abdicated responsibility as the price of a respite.
Italy was the hand-maiden of Germany. So it was Hitler who called
the tun.-.
Returning from Munich, Chamberlain seemed satisfied that Hitler's
last minute retreat from intransigence had wider significance. Obviously,
Hitler wanted to avoid w Chamberlain had gambled en this fi n
the beginning. Now the gamble was nearly up unless Hit: .ild
abi the Mui ich accords. It was a slim hope, at one. apogee
and the beginning of the end for his policy of appeasement. The
initiative was still in the hands of Hitler and the British were made
to appear to have given away something that wasn't theirs to give.
The debate at the time was acrimonious and remains so.
Chamberlain argued in Parliament that he had sought at Munich to sub-
stitute an orderly for a violent method of carrying out an agreed
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["decision. The differences I I on the Munich accord and the Goclesberg
memorandum of September 23 would show to what degree he and Daladier
8*i
had been successful.
There ts a point by point comparison of the two documents
in the 1938 Survey of Internat ion al A f f h Vol. Ill that conclud
The detailed comparison of the terms of
Godesberg and Munich shows the nakedness of
the former was but thinly covered by the
cloak of some ambitious verbir d the
prov i s ion f or international procedure contained
in the latter. The general effect of the Munich
Agreements was to register acceptance of I
terms dictated at Goclesberg. °5
The author goes on to say that the peace was saved because Britain and
France demanded nothing more of the Germa in to go h the
motions of international consultation. In reality, it would seem
that peace was saved because of the Czech willingness to gc along
with the Munich Agreements. As At t lee ssi d , "It is the Czechs who
kept the peace of Europe; it is their sacrifice which has averted
,,86
wa r . '
'
Chamberlain found opposition for Munich widespread. Yet,,as in
the past, "the various dissenters; were unable to work together, form-
87
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' Cooper resigned from the Cabinet, arguing in his resignatioi i ch '
that Hitler had introduced a new language, a new morality and new
methods into Europe. The old diplomatic methods would no longer suf-
fice. The language that Hitler understood was that of the "mailed
88
fist", language not forthcoming from Ch loin.
Yet attractive as Cooper's -re, they depended on
i
Strength, specifically military strength, in which England was
deficient. Chamberlain, for his part, was willing to make large
sacrifices to gain a lasting settlement in Europe. Whether or not
having a position of greater power from which to deal would have
a 1 to reel his Is is open to conjecture.
As for the rest of the opposition, their silence has moved c
wi iter to ask; "What happened to those who had sided with Duff Cooper
89throughout September?" They could not have helped being caught up
in the vast sense of relief that seemed to sweep the country. Certainly
the desire for unity; which implied a sense of security, was strom
to some than the need to call attention to the defeat suffered at
Munich. Whatever reasoning, whatever justification, it remained for
the press and not the parliamentary opposition to voice concern for
88
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r~ 90 ~ifuture cf British foreign policy. '
Still 'bate in Parliament was nol \ \ thout some strong
attacks upon Chamberlain. Nicolson, Attlee, Geoffrey Mander, Viscou,
Craneborne and others castigated the Munich Agreement in varying
degrees. On October 6, Chamberlain closed the debate by contending
that Britain still must seek to avoid war and that the bed. method
to do this was analyze the roots of conflict and try to settle them
by collaboration and good will. He again stated t ; felt public
opinion becked his policy of appeasement and, in any event, "we had
91
no treaty obligations and no legal obligations to Czechoslovakia..."
Chamberlain went on to mention rearmament and a di Fen; 1 /iew,
but closed by reiterating his belief in his policy — "t< the
collaboration of all nations, not excluding the totalitarian States,




Vol. 339, col. 5^5. A Foreign Office paper
circulated shortly Fter Munich suggested that the guarantee to
Czechoslovakia should be kept "as innocuous as we can" and as
"little likely to come into operation as possible." (Great Britain.
Public Record Office, Foreign Office, Series 371, paper C ]k'-\J}/h2/]8,
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The House then voted on two motions, one to approve the govern- '
ment's action at Munich and supporting its effort to secure a lasting
peace and the other to not support the government. The latter failed
150 to 369 , while the motion to support gained a 366 to 144 victory.
But the voting had cut across party lines. Each dissenter had his
reasons, sometimes widely at variance with others, but perhaps
one thing that linked them was their common fear that the Chamberlain
government was ignorant of the larger implications in Central Europe
and, as a consequence, refused to take the measures necessary for
the maintenance or European security.
Besides showing the breadth of oppc the Munich Settle-
ment, the debate in Parliament brought the issues back into focus.
In doing this, it served its Lest purpose. The question of "winners"
and "losers" could now be examined, and some Englishmen found it
strange that Munich should be received with more enthusiasm by the
"losers" in Paris and London than by the "winners" in Berlin and Rome.
And what of Czechoslovakia? Clearly now, in the British conscience,
there was room for guilt to co-exist with the sense of relief. The
public became aware of the nearness of the abyss and the failures of






polic nearly push m over the rim. This is not to say
lie opinion swung quickly away from Chamberlain. Then
widespread relief at the Munich settlement. But what d< /eloped
the days after Munich might best be I . ibed as "a powerful under-
go
current of anxiety and concern..." ' In the final analysis, as A.J. P.
Taylor says! "What was done at Munich mattered les h n the way in
which it was done; and what was said about it afterwards on both sides
96
counted for still more.' 1
In the next weeks, as Germany, dominating the International Co
mission, proceeded to grab more of Czechos lovaki a than had been
proposed, even in the Codesberg Memorandum, British opinion hardened,
97both against Germany and appeasement. Chamberlain, for his part,
turned . ay from Central Europe -- the fate of appeasemenl tl ' was
no longer in his hands. Instead, he sought to reestablish ties wi

















' Even as Germany, Poland and Hungary carved territory from the
Czech state, a familiar pattern began once again to show itself.
Reports from European posts began to talk of Hitler's next movi
.
Hitler, for his part, sought to minimize the impression that he
might hove turned reasonable by remarking in October that it would be
England would free herself from certain arrogances left over
99
from the Versailles epoch."
But behind the talk, Hitler seemed to care little for what
eithei Britain or France felt. The parceling up of Czechoslovakia
went on until November. At that time the acting Chairman of the
International Commission proposed dissolution of the commission as
the Final delimitation of the Czech-German border had been i The
British representative op this move and the Commission's lifi
1 00
was extended until December. Yet from beginning to end, the
Commis?iop was nothing more than a rubber stamp for German wishes.
As Ogi 1 vie-Forbes, the British delegate (and Charge at Berlin during
Henderson's illness) put it, "all questions arising out of the Munich
agreement have been and will be at German Nazi dictation." !n
99
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his opinion, the Commission migM ; well be dead for all the use it I
was.
Chamberlain an I . rnment, meanwhile, continued to put new
emphasis on the Anglo-
I
tal i an connection. Chamberlain had long sought
to separate Italy from Germany. Though after Munich, the wisdom of
such a move (or, indeed, the value) was open to question, the Govern-
1 03
ment pressed forward in the face of little parliamentary opposition.
The Anglo-Italian agreement of 16 April 1938, so long on ice, was
brought into effect in November.
As 1938 closed, travel was in the air, Ribbentrop had scuttle*
off to Paris in early December to sign a Pact with the French whicl
was, in form, much like the personal agreement signed by Chamberlain
and Hitler at Munich, except that it also included a pledge of mutual
1 O^t
respect for frontiers. Meanwhile, Chamberlain and Halifax, hopeful
of securing an atmosphere of detente with Mussolini, were packing
to go to Italy in early January. Finally, Col. Beck, the Polish





, pp. 1 S7-8.
1 0':
1 Livre Jaune: Documen ts Dip! oma : igues 1938-39 (France:




those who weren't traveling were talking, save Hitler, who was doing
her, but true to form was acting. In early November, a German
diplomat in Paris was murdered by a Polish exile Jew. In Germany
this resulted in a we 1 1 -orchestrated pogrom in which anti-Jewish
violence reached new extremes. As the murder had come in the midst
of an anti-British press campaign in Germany, attempts were made to
1'ink British politicians with the crime.
Ogi 1 vie-Forbes, with more character than Henderson seems able
to have ever dredged up, reported to London that the persecution was
of a severity unprecedented in modern times. In aparticularly prescient
stater. said: "[The German Jews] dwell in the grip and at t!
mercy of a brutal oligarchy, v/hich fiercely resents all humanitarian
foreign intervent ion. .. [they] are, indeed, not a national but a world
problem, which, if neglected, contains the seeds of a terrible
,,106
vengeance."
Much of Ogi 1 v ie-Forbes ' feelings seemed e echoed in the
British government. In Medlicotts view, the program destroyed the
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hat remained of Ger i grievances.
'
poqrom , the German decision on 10 December to increase
.submarine tonnage to that of the British Commonwealth, an action that
1 r.Q
is sanctioned by the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935 , and the
Ivirulci nti-Brftish press attacks all combined to harden itish
,iion. Gy the year's end, the spirit of Munich, if it had ever
existed, was dissipated. The most widely feared question v/as: where
next would Hitler strike?
The mili lory attache in Berlin f e i t that the German thrust would
be eastward, though ha did not think it would include the military
occupation of Czechoslovakia to round off recent successes. As regan
the Ukraine and/or Poland, though no direct evidence existed, there-
were sufficient ind icat ions, and nothing to i fute them, that Hitler's
1 09
next thrust would be there. Earlier, in reporting on the build-up
of the German Army, the attache, Col. Mason-MacFar lane, had predicted
that the Army would reach a peak of efficiency in September of 1939-
'tied 1 i cot t , British For. Pol .
,
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opinion in \ /hi i followed that of MacFarlane. The most
plausible assessment was that Hitler would begin agitating for an
pendent Ul so as to provide hi i materials he pro-
ved to need to achieve autarchy. Britain could not hope to inter-
in such a move. As Og i 1 vie-Forbes pointed out in early
January of 1939:
If Hitler is determined to reach out for raw
terials end to create a system of Central
European vassal states in compensation for the
lost German colonial empire, nothing in practice
can stop him from demanding either complete
surrender ... or taking forcible action...
[Britain] cannot guarantee the sta tus quo in
Central and Eastern Europe. llZ
Chamberlain had expressed these fears and a new one, that of a
German air strike against Britain before hostilities with Trance were
begun. Daladier assured Chamberlain that France would come to
Britain's assistance, but he could not help wonder why Britain did
not concentrate on building bombers to car; retaliatory raids
rather than improving anti-aircraft defenses. This he thought would
be more impressive to the Germans. Chamberlain seems to have had
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of proportion the possible effects of bombing, as did mu '
of his staff, both civilian and military. In fact, the power of the
German air foro is consistently ove J. This is perhaps under-
standable in view of Britain's insular position, but if it was a real
fear, it was also exaggerated, as the post-war strategic bombing
surveys would show. Still, Chamberlain had to take these threats
into consideration in carrying cut his policies between Munich and
Prague. As a result, a certain ambivalence crept into his outlook.
Efforts had to be made in defense. Yet the long-term goal was still
to secure peace and stability. British attempts to rearm brought
abuse from Hitler and talk of British war-monger ing was heard in
Germany. Chamberlain thus faced the dilemma of being unable to ap-
pease Hitler without leaving England more defenseless. If he were I
take the "latter course, public opinion would have probably de
him. His appeasement policy was dying of reality.
Clearly, the post-Munich period would have been an opportune time
for a decisive change in foreign policy. A new initial' . >uld ha
probably been welcomed by the mass of British op i 1 or Ch. srlain,
in words he used to describe Hitler, "missed the bur 11 in the mon
after Munich. By ignoring or failing to realize the enormity of the
Nazi threat, he projected a sense of security -when, on all sides,




The I trip i early January is a case in point. Ostensibly'
its purpose was to promote Anglo-Italian detente. Yet the talks were
held without an agenda, and no headway was made in bending the Axis
or even of obtaining an Italian guarantee of Czechoslovakia. As
Rock puts it: "The conversati ons were drab and in no way decisive."
Ho in felt otherwise at the time. He returned to England with
I ifax, "...fortified in our belief in Anglo-Italian friendship
and in our hopes for the maintenance of peace."
On the one hand Chamberlain wished to see appeasement steadily
succeeding. On the other, he had to contend with new reports of an
impending invasion of Holland by the Nazis, Thus at Birmingham
on January 28th, he told the Jewelers Association', "Let us contir:>-
to pursue the path of peace and conciliation, but until we can
on a general limitation of arms let us continue to make this counti
Strong." The unreality is obvious -- he could not have it both
ways, at least vis-a-vis Hitler. Yet either way Hitler would win.
Were Britain to seek peace without rearming, Hitler could expand at
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'policy as self-protective. Again the post-Munich syndrome paralyzed '
in: he could not abandon his outmoded policy, but had to
accept its near uselessness. Thus he made partial concessions that
sat I no one and gave fuel to Hitler. What irony there is in the
man oP pc mfi ent of the success of appeasement going to Rome
and inquiring of Mussolini what Hitler's next aggressive move would
be!
118
Yet in spite of the continuing signs of the imminence of Nazi
action, Chamberlain clung to his policy. The chance, it seemed,
voluntarily to take a new initiative in foreign policy was rapidly
in early February, there was a false glimmer of hope that
Nazi expansion might be put off. I lendi son, ! .In his Berlin post,
began filing his usual optimistic dispatches. in his opinio. ,
nothing in the way of "adventures" was planned in the near future by
Hitler. Memel would probably revert to Germany and Danzig too.
Czechoslovakia might also be squeezed, but slowly. Henderson
"believed in fact that [Hitler] wou Id. . . 1 i ke in his heart to return
1 19to the fold of comparative respectability."''
Meanwhile, back in the real world, plans were nearing completion
for the German occupation of Bohemia and Mo /ia, the "Czechia" re-
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1~of Chamberlain -- against the advice of H lifax and the Foreign
120
Office " — were competing with each other to issue optimistic status
reports concerning the tranquility of the European scene. Perhaps the
height > re; h d on 10 March 1933 by Sir S ; Hoare speaking to
his constituency, spoke of a possible "golden age" and decried the
i nevi tab i 1 i ty or war.
it same day, the British minister in Prague reported that
various high government officials had been dismissed, that there
had been demonstrations in Bratislava and that there was persistent
propaganda for the complete independence of Slovakia under German
protection. From Paris, a report was received of increasing military
pressure by Germany. And most remarkable of all, a report from
Hen n in Berlin was received in which he recognized that, "if
Hitler seeks adventure the most obvious form which it would be likely
1 22
to take would be some coup in Czechoslovakia."
120
Roc k , Chamber Tain
, p . 1 69
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The Times (11 March 1939). Rock, A ppeasement , footnotes that
Hoares words were later mis- i interpreted to he an unconditional
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The last, Henderson's, was minutes in the Foreign Office, by Sir 0.
Sargent \-,ho noted: "Sir M. Henderson here for the first time
recognizes the possibility that Herr Hitler may seek adventure..."
He then compares the dispatch with Henderson's earlier, optimistic





last Few clays before Hitler's "adventure" in Czechoslovakia '
re ones of confusion and rumor. Though trouble had be ing
I for weeks and, after March 10, hac! reached crisis proportions, only a
expected a German take-over of Czechoslovakia. British policy
I in appeasement, but at least the government was now
•latedly committed to rearmament.
• A Foreign Office memorandum on tl h of March reviewed the
crisis in Czechoslovakia and saw little chance of the State remain in
viable and still less of British intervention to save it from German
123
aggression, should it come to that. In sng term, Czechoslovakia
had ceased to exist at Munich, The events of the next few days would
only serve to ci ifirm this.
Ye i ippea: en1 a; a policy did not dow when I - Nazis
marchec! through Prague, nor did a search for an alternative to
appeasement begin promptly at 8 a.m. or, h 16, 1939- Rather appease-
ment went bankrupt by degrees and, in some quarters, the Search for a
viable alternative became a function of tho c-e degrees of failure. That
both the failure of appeasement and the search for a new policy were
determined by the dynamism of Nazi expansion seems clear. Yet
Chamberlain had to contend with other factors which put their own
pressures on foreign policy formulation. Among these could be cited:
23
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>\ he Spanish Civil War, the expansion of Japan in the Far East, and
ire of the Commonwealth nations to avoid a continental involve-
Domestic pressures constantly with Chamberlain. He found
increasing party discontent with the Cabinet's composition, especially
iich. Farmers were upset about milk and grain supports as
ell. Additionally, William Rock cites information that shows by-
elections afterward Munich tended to present a trend of opposition
to Chamber iai n. Of prime importance was the inability of Britain's
defenses to support a more aggressive foreign polccy.
Consistently, though, Chamberlain sought to look beyond these
issues to >ght was the key to Brit! curity: Anglo-
German relations. His chosen method to secure lasting, peaceful
relations was appeasement. The Prime Minister cannot, in truth, be
faulted for having had the courage of his convictions. Still, in all,
by blindly following appeasement, he perhaps abandoned all chances of
finding alternatives when his policy began El. Trie chapters
that follow examine some of the reasons why the government --and, in
particular, Chamberlain-- could not or would not find alternatives





pp. 2HC-1. He ;:lso warns with the
words of Th e Economi st (12 November 1938) that: "...the int






THE ECLIPSE OF THE FOI OFFICE
"...if only the Foreign Office will play up."
— Neville Chamberlain
When Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937. he inherited,
among other liabilities, a Foreign Office 5d by interwar years
of neglect, public suspicion and the flouting of the normal processes
of diplomacy by his predecessors, Lloyd Geo-ge and Ramsay MacDonald.
Having fallen victim to the widely held belief that the "secret diplo-'
macy" had been the principal cause of World War I, the Foreign Office
in the years after Vcrsai 1 les did little to attempt to dispell this. As
a result the Foreign Office was unable to reassert its position as the
principal advisor to the Cabinet in matters of foreign policy. Addi-
tionally, policies came to be formulated outside the Office and only
2
belatedly (or, in some cases, not at all) transmitted to it. Also,
the proliferation of overseas activities in economic and mil'tary af-
fairs that came with the war were never successfully coordinated in the
Gordon A. Craig, "The British Foreign Office from Grey to Austan
Chamberlain," pp. V/-8 in Craig and Gilbert, eds. , The Diplomats . The authors
believe that, "...the greatest disadvantage under which the British
diplomatic establishment had to operate. . .was the persistent suspicion







J~one logical department, the Foreign Office, thus diluting the tradi-
tional Office powers even more. Put simply, the Foreign Office never
.overed from the war. As a result, it was a pale shadow of its
former self, content to carry on the day- to-day business of interna-
tional Ions, while the formulation of policy drifted, dependent
on the interest of the Prime Minister.
It was Stanley Baldwin's disinterest in foreign affai that
first brought Neville Chamberlain into policy making. He participated
in foreign policy decisions as early as 193*'+ and was soon so deeply
:d as to be considered as a possible replacement for Sir Samuel
Hoare as Foreign Secretary (see Chapter 3)-
By 1937, he had a working knowledge of foreign affai s and I
Foreign Office. How deep a knowledge is open to question, but the
fact remains that he had at least three years exposure to Foreign Of-
fice thinking. From all reports, he was determined to make substan-
tive changes in the department.
It is probably not going too far to assert that:
As early as the spring of 1936, he (Chamberlain)
seems to have reached a decision to secure for him-
self a dominant position in the formulation of
British pol icy.
3
3Marion L. Kenney, "The Role of the House of Commons in British
Foreign Policy During the 1937~8 Session" in Norton Downs, ed. t Essays






Still lie distrusted the officials of the Foreign Office and was
ready to circumvent them by his personal diplomacy, intervening, "...
more than isual and natural concern of the Prime Minister with
foreign affairs would justify." The initial confrontation was be-
tween a confident , aggressi ve Chamberlain and a Foreign Office that was
5depleted and without direction. What opposition to appeasement there
i
was in the office was in a handful of its leading personal it ies--
Vansittart, Phipps, Eden and Kennard on the. first level, Orme Sargent,
Eric Beckett and a few othei s on the next level. Chamberlain for
his part had the backing of Geoffrey Dawson and the Times , his own
7
net, the "CI ivedei Set" and Al 1 Souls.
'




Chapter XX outlines the Prime Minister's
initial moves upon taking office.
r
Sir Robert Vansittart, Permanent Undersecretary of State for
Foreign Affairs (1930-38), Chief >matic Advisor to the
Government ( 1938-41 )
.
Sir Eric Phipps, Ambassador to Berlin (1933~37)> Ambassador to
Paris (1937-^0).
Sir Howard Kennard.. Ambassador to Warsaw ( 193^-39) •
Sir Orme Sargent, Assistant Undersecretary in the Foreign Office
(1933-38), Deputy Unde -secretary (1939).
Eric Beckett, Assistant Legal Advisor to the Foreign Office
(1936-40).
7
'The role of Geoffrey Dawso 1 and The Tines in the formulation of
British foreign policy is covered in John Evelyn Wrench, Geof frey Dawso n
and Our Times ( London : Hu tch i nso 1 , 1 955 ) and Th e History of t he T i me
s
,
Vol IV, part 2 (London' Pri nti ng -louse Square, 1952). The "Cliveden Set 1
was the name given to a group of >eople, including many government of-
ficials— though seldom Chamberlai 1— favorable to appeasement who par-
ticipated in weekend gatherings at Cliveden, Lady Astor's country estate.
The influence wielded by this grojp is still debated. As for the role




As with the political opposition to Chamberlain, those in tl
Fore ion Office who opposed appeasement were divided and in some cases,
as we shall see, worked against each other. Chamberlain, on the other
hand, had the unity that years of patient work hod brought. Too, the
Foreign Office had been under attack so long that it was highly vulner-
able. Even in 1S3^j ss Eden became Foreign Secretary, the power he and
the Office had to formulate policy was highly questionable. "Fleet
Street, Whitehall, the fashionable little I treets of Westminister,
the Common Room at All Souls and the terraces library at Cliveden
were the places in which foreign policy was perpetually discussed, and
those who took part in these endless conversations were convinced that
it was their duty and their right to influence up to the hilt and to
manipulate M possible all major decisions on foreign afi
In the weeks that immediately followed Chamberlain's assumption
of the Prime Ministry, the final act in the transfer of the machinery
for the formulation of Anglo-German policy from the Foreign Office to
No. 10 Downing St. was played out.
As might be expected, Chamberlain set out to reform the Cabinet
into something besides a repository for party politicians. The number
of peers in ministerial jobs increased, removing the positions from
the heat and dust of the House of Commons. As the Cabinet took shape,
Chamberlain's ideas became more clear: he would be the chief
o






and his colleagues would be primarily administrators. I
Leo Amery described Chamberlain as "...a general i r who
wi ; d to know what his departmental managers were doing, to discuss
ir problems witl m and keep them up to the mark. What is more,
he know his own mind and saw to it that he had his way." ' It was an
attitude that seemed to be acceptable to all the Cabinet, even Eden.
• The position of the Foreign Office in the face of Chamberlain's
attitude was ironic and eventual ly humi
1
iating. Its gradual loss of
the power to formulate policy in the interv.ar years had left it wi
' executive duties, an antiquated administrative framework and a seeming
incapacity to deal with the faster-moving world of the 1930' s. Its
hope rested with its leaders, particularly with Eden. But in spite
of a superficial initial rapport bet' n tl Foreign Secret; ry and
Chamberlain, it soon became evident that tension between the two men
was on the rise. Undeterred by any consciousness of his own inade-
quacy in the field of foreign af fa i rs, Ch; in set out with deter-
mination on t fie course of appeasement, a course which he had convinc
himself was the correct one. If we .are to believe Feiling, he hoped to
q
Thompson, Ant i -appeasers
, p. 139.
i n
Leo Amery, My Pol ? t i ca l Life , Vol III, The Up forgivi ng Year s
(London: Hutchinson, 1952), p. 225-
Thompson, Anti-appeasers
, pp. 1 39—^+0. See also Anthony Eden,
Facing the D ic tators (Boston: Houghton Miff 1 in, 1962), p. 501 and
Temp 1 ewood , Nine Troubled Yea rs
, p . 257-
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'win a "br. ng space" or "...perhaps win peace too" by approaching
13
nethe dicta >rs directly and personally discussing grievances. T
decision to take this approach mean' >sing normal diplomatic chan-
nels and procedures. It also meant "...inevitably and logically re-
jecting the Foreign Office and the professional diplomatist, and
meant rejecting or suppress i ng the Foreign Secretary."
dejecting the Foreign Office coil easily enough done. Reject-
ing or suppressing the Foreign Secretary would be another matter. Some
of Chamberlain's early gains were through errors in the Foreign Office.
The first of these occurred j ust before Chamberlain took office and was
to have re] ions to the eve of the war.
,'ly in 1937? it was decided to replace Sir Eric Phi ps, the
Ambassador in Deri in. Ironically, the choice of Sir Nevile Hendersonwas
15initially made by the Permanent Under-Secretary, Sir Robert Vansittart.
Although Connell suggests that Henderson's pro-German views
influenced his selection, a logical conclusion, neither Vansittart nor
Eden say this. In fact, each outdoes the other in claiming the dubious
honor of having settled on the undistinguished Henderson. Whoever
















'was responsible, the title of Henderson's memoirs sums up vividly I
17
his embassy at Berlin. More important, the anti-German
int in the Foreign Office was significantly weakened. The appoint-
': of Henderson was the first step in the Office's loss of any chance
to have a say in the handling of Anglo-German relations in the
Chamberlain Government.
As Eden so openly puts it:
It was an international misfortune that we should
have been represented in Berlin at this time by a
man who, so far from warning the Nazis, was con-




Phipps went to Paris, a locale that Eden called his "spiritual
19home." ' For Henderson, the unlooked-for promotion near the end of an
undistingu reer was disastrous, to him as well as lis country.
The maneuver ing behind Phipps ' removal had been extensive. Of particular
consequence was a series of talks in 1936 between Thomas Jones and
Hitler and Ribbentrop. The talks took place in Munich w re Jones, who
was secretary Lo Baldwin as he had been to Lloyd George, fell under the
sway of the Fuhrer and, more important, Ribbentrop. Upon his return to
London, Jones took up the subject of Foreign Affairs with Baldwin.
1 7Nevile Henderson (Sir), Failure of a _M i s s ? on (Hew York:
Putnam's, 1940).
1 o





' k-ending with the Prime Minister, Jones rela: '
Before 1 coving, just before lunch on Sunday morn-
ing, I read to the P. M. in the study downstairs
this epitome of my various harangues which I had
written down in resDonse to a sudden question
from him, "What an to do?"
One of the "harangues" dealt with improving Anglo-German relations
by replacing Phipps with "...a man of the D'Abernon or Wellington type,
unhampered by professional diplomatic tradition, able of course to
'srman, and to enter with sympathetic interest into Hitler's
21
aspi r<<t i ons." Ribbentrop had worked well on Jones. Within a year,
Phipps was gone. in the interim, Jones continued to press for his re~-
a 1 , at one poi nt cla ii i i g I Ph i p\. s "... has no ' telepho I
22
to Hitler, who despises him." ' Lven the appointment of rson
didn't seem to please him --perhaps because Jones did not - but
he accepted without comment Baldwin's statement that the Prime Minister
had gone into the matter with Eden an- and "...they could
find no one in the Service better than H , son, 'who was a man and a
good shot.'""" So in April, 1 33
7
j Sir Nevile Henderson became His
Majesty's Ambassador to Germany. "Sir Nevile has done his stint in
20





lbid . p. 300.
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'south America. He shall have his reward," was Vansittart's comment '
on the appointment.
Henderson, for his part, felt he "...had been specially selected
by Providence with the definite mission of, as I trusted, helping to
25
preserve the peace of ! orld." ' Part of his mission, it became
quickly apparent, was to circumvent the regular Foreign Office channels
ahd ply the Prime Minister direct with letters and visits to give his
views on the direction and form British policy towards Germany should
take.
Henderson's tenure in Berlin is well -covered by his own memoirs,.
Fai lur< >n, as well as by Craig end Gilbert in D i p 1 oma t s
(Chapter 17) and L. B. Namier in Europe in Decay (pp. 17^~175). The
picture that emerges is one of "...a tug-of-war b< tw < . in
his own Foreign Office rather than... a diplomat anxious to act as
faithful interpreter' of the instruct: : "ed from London. „27
In time, his mission became an obsess ioi ight to carry through
Chamberlain's policy. Thus, his identification with appeasement quickly
became complete and, with it, his estrangement from the Foreign
2k
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Felix Gilbert, "Two British Ambassadors: Perth and Henderson"
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1 ui f ice. '
For the Foreign Office, 'the wire ''own 1 between London and
Berlin. Gradually they were cut off from a policy-making role in Anglo-
German relations as the Henderson-Chamber la in connection le the
channel of communication.
But Eden and Vansittart could afford to waste little time in
onizing over the decision to send Henderson on his mission. Vans it-
t, in particular, was in a precarious position. He was not liked
by Chamber lain and Eden, sensitive to ciaipvs that he was "his master's
voice", that is to say, an echo of Vansittart, began to entertain the
29
idea of replacing Sir Robert as Permanen ler-Secretary. Chamberlain
apparently put some pressure on Eden and Eden himself >.. s ek-
ing someone more "...patient, quiet in his manner, more of a civil
30
se rvan t than. . . V a n s i 1 1 a r t .
"
As with the Phi pps-Henderson business, the removal of Vansittart
had deeper origins. In both cases the changes were ostensibly inter:
Foreign Office matters. But upon closer examination, the h s of the
28
LkliL- > P- 552. But Gilbert reminds us that, "a critical or
objective approach would have mads the reasons for his appointment
futile; his mission would have besn even less than the fulfillment of
a routine function and would, indeed, have destroyed the foundations
of the Chamberlain policy to whict he was fully committed."
29
Eden, Facing the Dictator;, p. 590.
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'appeasers ;pr::ar. In the case of Vansi ttart 's removal, an appi
was made through Eden's newly-appointed Parliamentary Private Secretary,
Mr. J. P. L. Thomas, in late May, 1937 that revealed the depth of anti-
hy felt towards Vanslttart by the Chamber la i ni tes
.
Sir Hoi ace Wilson, the Industrial Adviser to the Prime Minister,
and Sir Warren Fisher, the head of the Civil Service, told Thomas that
they "...were thoroughly dissatisfied with the Foreign Office and
especially with Vans i ttart." Fisher and Wilson went on to call
Vansittai alarmist and claimed he hampered "...all attempts of the
Government to make friendly contact with dictator states and that'
his influence over Anthony Eden was very great.""' They said they
had backed Thomas' appointment as Parliamentary Private Secretary in
hopes of using him "...to build a bridge between 10 Downing Street
and the Foreign Office and to create understanding between the I
Departments. This might lessen the damage h had been done by
33Foreign Office in el and by Vansittart in particular."
Thomas refused to play up, replying that it seemed to him that
Wilson and Fisher expected him to work behind the back of Ecen. The
next day, Wilson tried to back off to Thorn
31










...Sir Horace spoke to me again and said that 1
Sir Warren was rather impulsive and that he did
think that I had obtained a clear view of
what was wanted of me. I replied that the view
wa s only too c 1 e a r . -^
So the attempt to place an informer in the Foreign Office fold-
o r
ed. But the implication was obvious: Vansittart was an obstacle Lo
Chamberlain's policy and a thorn in the side of the government. He
was thus in trouble from within and without. Meanwhile, as Vansittart's
influence was waning, Chamberlain openly began bypassing Eden.
Perhaps most obvious was the dispatching of Halifax (under
guise of attending a hunting exhibition) to Deri in end Berci len in
November of 1937 to sound out the German leaders. Yet, at first even
Eden was not strongly against the move. When he first heard of the
proposal. Eden's recollection was that, "...! was net eager, but s
no sufficient reason to oppose it."''
As it happened, the visit gained more significance in the public
eye than was intended, the belief rapidly gaining currency that Halifax 1 :
trip signaled a fundamental change in British policy. Eclen was aware
of Chamberlain's desire for personal contacts and noted that the Prime




Neville Thompson states "...there is no evidence to suppose that
Chamberlain even knew what Wilson was doing, though his advisers must











'to Hitler's Germany and that its method too slow for modern
times." 37
He made an approach to Chamberlain in the height of the tei
that had bi up over the proposed Halifax visit, but stopped short
of suggesting the visit be cancelled. At the same time his Parliament-
ary Private Secretary, J. P. L. Thomas, extracted from Wilson an admi
s'ion that, although there was no question of jealously between
Chamberlain and Eden, the former did feel his policy of personal
op
- with the dictal r was correct.'
Halifax's visit produced more light . heat while having the
overall effect of weakening Eden's positi< Fi reign Office, a
fact later noted by the Foreign Secretary." 1 he talks themselves
merely emphasized the wide gulf that separated British desires from
Gen bitions without proposing solution .
Meanwhile, Vansittart now seemed aware of plans to remove him.
When hi s Secretary, Clifford Norton, left to take up the post of Counsel-
lor in Warsaw in November, 1S37> Sir Robert confided to him:
They are trying to get rid of me. They want a Per-
manent Head whom they can push around. They know I
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' But go lie did in January, 1938. "It wasn't that I had lost con- *
fidence in him," Eden later commented. "The fact is that Van had been
a long time in his post and he was becoming ineffecti ve—no longer get-
4l
ting along with the other heeds of Departments in Whitehall." Too,
a new face stilled the murmurs of "his master's voice" often heard, \
hi
are told, when Eden soug speak strongly on Anglo-German issi
' Vansittart had earlier been offered Paris
?
where Eden felt he
could "...exercise an exceptional influence," but had turned it down.
h< /as "kicked upstairs," with Chamberlain's agreement, to a newly
created office: Chief Diplomatic Advisor to His Majesty's Government.
Sup; / the post was parallel to that of Sir Horace Wilson, who \
43
f Industrial Advisor, but in truth it was honorific and little
else. Wilson was a i ber of the inner group of Chamberlain's advisors
and constantly accumulated power, while Vansittart had the ground cut
out from under him.
How much power Vansittart had lost became evident in late January
when an Eden memorandum defined Vansittart's status and activities.
Policy papers would go from the new Permanent Under-Secretan/ of State













cretary desired Vansi rt's advice would be sent him by Ed. '
Generally
,
ing, lie would no longer see papers until after action
' been taken.
Eden's triumph-- if it may be called that-- in freeing himself from
Vansittart was short-lived. Even before the transfer Chamberlain was
trying to bring Eden around to a supposedly more realistic foreign
policy, especially towards Italy. He also tried to further circumvent
Foreign Secretary by talcing into his confidence two former--and
previous d i scred i ted— Foreign Secretaries, Sir John Simon and Sir Sam
Hoare. With t! later addition of Lord Halifax, this small group cai
to ( i foreign policy formulation. Phis "Big Four" ' plus Sir
ace Wilson cut across cabinet and parliamentary lines in their
search for accommodations with the dictators.
Eden received at least one warning that he and Chamberlain were
on a collision course. On February 7> 1932. Vansittart came to tell
him thai
;
...from now on foreign affairs would be run by tl \
P r i me M i n i s te r , with the he 1 p of a srna 1 1 c omm i t to ,
of which the spokesman naturally would be a member,
and that if I myself did not fall in with their
wishes, I should follow Vansittart soon.^"
Colvin, Vansi ttart in Office
, p. l"/ ;4.











i confronted Chamberlain with the story. I he Prime Mini
reacted with astonishment, but [den was not reassured. He had good
reason not to be, as the divergenci.es in the two men's thinking over
the I tali ion had come into tl i weeks before. Wl
the issue of how to handle talks with Italy intensified, the gulf be-
tween the men became more apparent. Eden came to believe that the
Prime Min was displaying immoderate I approaching Mussolini,
le Chamberlain felt that the Foreign Seer*.; / was obstructing his
efforts to open discussions.
By mid-Februai
,
the two men had reached a crossroads and tl
split emerged wi th suddenness and force. Chamberlain was determined to
open up conversations with Mussolini. When the issue cam the
Cabinet, the Prime Minister made it clear that they had to choose between
him or the Foreign Secretary. Eden went. The aftermath was not the
crisis some had expected (see Chapter 1) and Chamberlain quickly moved
one of the "Big Four", Lord Halifax, into the Foreign Ministry.
The balance sheet of Anschluss showed Chamberlain had in fact taken the
Foreign Office, at least at one level. Put it must be noted that in
the case of Sir Eric Phipps and Sir Robert Vansittart, the decisions
were clearly internal Foreign Office ones. It is too much to accuse a
mysterious "they" of engineering Vansi ttart's removal, as docs Rowse. '
2+7
Co 1 v i n , Vansitta rt i n Office
, p . 172.
Rock, Chamber la in, p. 122.




arly, Phipps' transfer was in pare motivated by Thomas Jones' m !
ter the latter's visit to Hitler in 1936, but almost a ye
ipsed before the tr< was effected, giving it the suggestion of
ing iii fact a more routine than cabalistic transfer. In both cases,
the evidence seems to suggest that the moves were engineered inside I
Foreign Office, rather than directly by Chamberlain.
What of the replacements? As we have noted, Eden and Vansittart
fall over themselves as apolog i sts for havi, igned Henderson to
Berlin. It would seem that this was a windfall for Chamberlain, per-
haps a better choice than he himseif might have made.
Vansi ttart ' s replacement was Sir Alexander Cadogan, whose r
ly published diaries cast new light on the man who was the criti-
cal years between 1J33 and 13': the senior civil servant in the
Foreign Office. (One could argue that Vansittart was, in fact, senior,
but Cadogan held the post with power). Far from being "...colourless
and ineffective,"'" Cadogan appears to have, under the cloak of bureau-
cratic neutrality, operated effectively in the somewhat confused border-
line between official authority and ministerial initiative. Rowse con-
tends that Cadogan was promoted "...to run the Foreign Office in the
50
Indeed in the case of Phi>ps, Chamberlain was not yet Prime
Minister, though he was certainly tied up in Foreign Affairs.
c
i
David Dilks, ed., The Cad >ga n D iar i js (Mew York: Putnams,
1972).
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'interest of Chamberlain's disastrous courso.""
1
' Yet the truth of tl
matter seems to be that he en worked closely together and that
he took Eden's side in the controversy that led to the Foreign Secre-
tary's resignation.
If we are to believe his diaries, Cadogan was as much an anti-
appeaser as Vansittart, though less of an ti Nazi. In fact, Cadoo
nt so far as, in the midst of the war, to blame Eden for appeasement:
Does A. (Anthony Eden) realize that he is responsi-
ble for ti.e great and tragic 'appeasement '--not
reacting to German occupation of the Rhineland in
1936? How lucky he is— no one his ever mention
that | and that was the turning point.
the diaries is a m ^longed to nei
rlain, Eden or Halifax. At first he leaned towards 1 la
. bu1 in time began to recognize the bankruptcy of appeasement.
As early as February, 1938, he could say half in jest, "Brave words
butter no parsnips."" By 1 939 * though, the mood and words gr »re
grim. At the occupation of Prague, he called Chamberlain's initial
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' In riod just before Prague, he sought to mini
ing accounts em ' ig from Nevile Henderson. Henderson had gone so far
as to say that, treated rightly, Hitler would become gradually more
pacific. Cadi >nn meanwhile was commenting on having "...the profound-
58
it suspicions of Hitler's intentions."''
As for Lord Halifax, Eden's replacement, his sympathies with
59Chamberlain are amply recorded. Yet he n the long run the most
flexible of the "Big Four." He gradually i From Chamberlain's
policy line. Even Rowse must admit: "To do Halifax justice, it seems
that his approai h to Munich was always more sceptical than that of the
other three."
Halifax had no> hed to become Foreign Secretary there is,
per, p; b ': of this, an altitude t< Chamb ' i icy best
described as pragmatic and tentative. He seems to have never been con-
vinced as was Hoare or Simon that appeasem it was the correct course.
Too, he seems to have given Cadogan a great a of latitude for
action, reserving for himself actions on only the most important papers.
If a judgement can be made by his minutes on Foreign Office documents,
he had by 1939 unofficially rejected appeasement. One thing is clear:
58
!b_Ld_ . , p. 152.
59Edward F. L. Wood (First Earl of Halifax), Fulness of Days








is influence upon Foreign Office planning is far less evident
of his predecessor. He seems to have preferred a more low-
;ving the whip hand to Cadogan. Thus it was Cadogan who
I
« the buffer I I n the professional Foi Office personnel and
the political leadership. From above he was asked to implement
appe-j from below a much different line was espoused.
The the Foreign Office consistently opposed appeasement,
con isl ntly provided alternatives and consistently pushed for rearma-
ment. The evaluations of the German threat were generally sound. If
\ are to believe Lammers, ful ly two-thi rds of the more prominent anti-
ers were associated \i: ; tl Foreign ice. Yet their po
limited by their positions. Only Vans it tart among the most commonly
i 'd opponents of appeasement in the Foreign Office was even in a
policy-making position and his fate has been described above ,
As for the other profess ionai Foreign Office staff, their opposi-
tion was expressed mostly in the minutes to various reports, in par-
ticular those of Henderson from Berlin. A typical document, concerning
6'
'Though there seemed to be a widespread feeling that Germany was
on the verge of economic ruin. F.C. C3S3S/3/18, 5 March 1939 and F. 0.
C2ol2/15/3, 3 March 1939 are two among many Foreign Office reports that
predicted Germany's impending economic collapse and a role for Britain
in rebuilding the German economy in return for Hitler's agreement to
moderate his aims.
6?




'Anglo-German affairs would take about seven to ten days to circu-
late to the Fore ion Secretary. From there it might be shown to
Chamberlain, and, always afterwards, to Vansittart and R. A. Butler,
the men who was, after Chaml rl • ailed upon to def^
Gov ei il i cy In Pari i ai
The comments of William Strang, the Central Area head. and Orme
Sargent were consistently ant i -appeasement, as were those of Vansittart.
Henderson seems to have gotten cons istent short shrift from ell three
and, from time to time, Ivone Kirkpatrick, th< Parliamentary Under-
secretary, and even the generally restrained Cadogan joined in.
On Fori i Office position papers g other way, as might
be expected, strong stands were diluted as the paper percolated up-
wards. The ant i -appeasement stand of the Foreign Office staff thus
was rendered impotent by the inability to air their view beyond their
own circle. There seems to be, in the do . a tacit agreement
of acceptance of this fact and while some of the proposals advocated
by the Foreign Office staff bordered on what might be called "cuckoo-
cloud land," there was little reality of their being accepted.
£-3
It should be noted that in all probability Vansittart 1 s com-
ments were seldom read by Halifax, as papers were seen by Sir Robert
after the Foreign Secretary. Still, one cannot pass by such comments
as Vansittart's upon Henderson's March 3, 1939 report predicting a
period of relative calm in Czechoslovakia. Upon reading this a week
or so later when the report reached him, Vansittart commented acidly
that, "...this dispatch may stand as a monument to Sir N. Henderson's
political foresight (F. 0. C2533/8/18, 3 Kerch 1939). Little wonder
.that as late as July 1939, the Nazis were still agitating for Van-
iSittart's removal (P.O. CI 0165/15/18, 12 July 1939). J
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' At the outset of this chapter it was suggested that it was pro- '
|y not going too far to say that as early as Spring^l936 Chamberlain
had reached a decision to secure for himself a dominant position
in foreign policy formulation. In the implementation of this decision,
the role of the Foreign Office seems to have been one of acquiescence.
The political leadership imposed upon the Foreign Office after Eden's
resignation seems to have striven to put the best face on things until
Prague, in spite of the wealth of lower-level information indicating
the extent of the Nazi threat. Cadogan, for all his private railings
against the dangers of Hitlerism, fulfilled exactly the role of a civil




allowing his personal scruples to interfere. His private I lings re-
mained for his diary. Internal politics within the Office, especially
the Phipps transfer and the Vansittart "promotion", muted the most
anti-Nazi voices.
These factors, combined with Chamberlain's ernest desire to seek
solutions in personal diplomacy (see Chapter 3) end his reliance on
his inner cabinet, relegated the Foreign Office professionals to the
role of observers in the formulation of British foreign policy, part-
icularly Anglo-German policy.
Vansittart once wrote that "telling the truth about Germany has




Cental, and ultimate physical discomfort." To its credit, the Foreign
Off ire made gei efforts to tell the truth about Germany. its ability
to c< s slight because of the factors mentioned above, compounded
by the general suspicion of the diplomatic establishment that remain-
ed in the minds of large sections of the Britisi lie.
Thus, the Office was not credible and, as has been shown, there
; considerable i nternal maneuver i ng that precluded a more agressive
anti-German approach. It was sufficient for Chamberlain to install a
compliant political leadership in the Foreign Office in order to wrest
/ control of Anglo-German policy-making. Once Eden was eliminated,-
65
) '..'as assured. The bureaucratic neutrality of Cadogan served
to insulate Halifax and, more important, Chamberlain fi ie Foreign
Office opposition to appeasement.
What emerges in the conflict between the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Office from 1938 is a political takeover by Ch lain with
the concomitant transfer of the al 1 •- important question of Anglo-German
relations from the official to the ministerial side of the Foreign
Office. Subsequent to F.den ' s departure, the lower levels of the
Foreign Office seemed content to oppose Germany amongst themselves,
6^
Co 1 v i n , Vans ittart in Off ice, p . 3^6
.
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A. L. Flowse quotes Eric Beckett as having said of Eden's de-
parture: "It isn't only Eden, it's the Foreign Office that has been




'telling the truth to each other and giving vent to their rage in their '
diaries. Questions of degree a lain had neutralized still





CHAMBERLAIN REVISITED: THE MAN AS DIPLOMAT
'The art of diplomacy, as that of -colours,
has suffered much from the fascination which
it exercises upon the amateur. 1 '
--Harold Nicolson
Of Neville Chamberlain, Lloyd George was once quoted as having
said, "The worst thing that Neville Chamberlain did was to meet Hitler
let Hitler see him." As with so many offhand statements abc
Chamberlain, it has enough truth to obscure its basic fa
Chamberlain lias suffered much from the epigrammatist, an< :
to have emerged is a picture of the master appeaser gl I lly selling
out Europe until there was nothing left but war. His two biographers,
2
while sympathetic, have not been able to dispel this pictu< . !t
could be said, with some degree of accuracy, that Chamberlain has been
so long under the cloud of adverse public opinion as to raise serious
doubts that he and his policies will- ever get a fair hearing.
Quoted in Frank Owen, Tempestuous Journey (London: Hutchinson,
1954), p. 7'V-:.
2
The two official biographers, having access to his private
papers, have been Keith Feiling, T he Life of Me v i 1 1 e C harnbe r lain and





I Americm biographer has recently sought to provide a use '
summary of Chamberlain's life, and in doing so sew fit to divide his
. into two sections, one dealing with the pre-Prim? Ministerial
years and the oth controversial few years that followed his
3
May, 1937 assumption of power. in doing so he has provided an unwit-
ting guide to the contemporary historians' opinion of Chamberlai n —all
that went before 1937» 68 years of his life, counts for less than half
in any analysis. Munich and appeasement have come to so overshadow the
solid domestic achievements of his life as to obscure them almost
completely.
But if this chapter proposes to examine Neville CI berlain as
a diplomat, of what importance, it might be asked, are his domestic
achievements? Simply t h i c- : that in his life before 1S37> Neville
in developed certain psychological belief patterns that car-
ried over to his tenure as Prime Minister. It is proposed that these
psychological belief patterns, a composite of early failures and
uccesses, formed his outlook and his patterns of negotiation in his
dealings with Hitler. That indeed he should have expected success
seems clear. That ha did not gain success seems clear,. too
;
from a
twenty-five year vantage point. That he did not realize his failures
is not so clear, a still lively debating po^nt. Was he stupid, naive,
willful or some combination of the three?
s
3






•This chapter will attempt to show that he was, in reality, none of the
above, but rather a prisoner of a psychological belief system so care-
fully constructed as to allow no room to explore alternatives. Once
locked- in on appeasement, a logical product of his belief system, he
seemed unable to realize the deviousness of the dictators he faced. He
assume- ir goals to be not unlike his c til it was too late to
cfhange reality. It was not done from stupidity any more than much
present day disarmament negotiation, which has assumed that the Soviets
desiio nothing more than peace and capital expansion. In the fi
of history, one writer may view the past determined by cultural devel
le another may see it as economic change --are tl both
right or both wrong? We are all to some degree or another prisoners
thin our psychological belief systems; the ability to objectively
synthesize is seldom found until well after the fact. It is giv
to the few to grasp "this sorry scheme of things entire."
Tires, Neville Chamberlain as a diplc was truly a product of
his early years, in an age that, by own admission, he would have pre-
ferred to have seen remain Victorian'. "The late Victorian age for me,"
4
Contemporary work on the question of psychological belief
systems and "mi rror- image" diplomacy has been done by Co! i who,
in discussing SALT, has said: "In devising schema of deterrent re-
lationships, in composing a deterrent calculus, in the area of
bargaining-committment games, in speculating over viable rules and
thresholds for war limitations, a good number of leading civilian
strategists created a mirror-image opponent." ("What RAND Hath




Ihe once said, "was when new discoveries in science thrilling the "
5
world, and the centre of Africa .till painted yellow on the mop."
In many ways he remained Victorian even when confronted with tl
brusqi i lities of the h Century. Here, he was not alone. Perhaps
• of th cipal failings of English for* policy in the in1
is was its basis in 19th century ideas, ideals which had less and
less value in the face of the dynamism of Nazism and Fascism.
Still, if he preferred the 19th century, Chamberlain was not ui
aware of the 20th century. His takeover of the Foreign Office in 193
as thorough and businesslike as that engineered in Germany by
Ado! i i On tiie credit sid of the re> rd, he combined the vast
energy of the late Victorian age with the 20th century desire for social
change and created, as Minister of Health, far-reaching programs. At
Health, he was progressive and decisive, leaving behind an excellent
6
record of legislative and administrative reforms. at the
Treasury, he was less radical, but no less successful than he had been
as Minister of Health. In truth, his record as Pri n I s1 r, with
the obvious exception of Foreign policy, would put him among the better
British Prime Ministers.
5 Foiling, Chamber la
i
n, p. 1.






' anner of man was this, then, who cr. o much only to
verything that I have worked for, everything that I ha




For the influences that guided his early days we must, of neces-
sity, rely on Feiling and MacLeod. in both biographies there appears
little in Chamberlain's early life which would indical ire for
the outgoing political life. Indeed the opposite picture seems to
emerge.
Neville matured in a circle of sisters and
cousins which was inclusive and self-si
ficient. . .outside the group, I
uncomfortable and unsociable, . ; he
:self later said, bedevi: 'ccursed
shyness' --which in fact > fully
8overcame.
As a youno nr I : 1 a 1 :d little interest in politics --"No, I
g
don't take any interest in politics, and never shall." --and found
school, at least the upper grades, difficult and lonely.
irl. Debates, vol. 3:>i, col/292, 3 September 1939-
Rock, Chamberlain, p. 20-1. Macleoci attributes this clannish-
ness to the Chamberlain religious background of Unitarianism
( Chamb er l ajji
, p . 20- 1 ) .
q






After school and a trip through I Middle '
t com there came a six year advc in the Bahamas in an
attempt to grow sisal. The project ! with high hopes, only to
i isfortune until, in 1897, it was abandoned. One thing
clear: the failure of the < rise was I ie to a lack of energy
on Chamberlain's part. He singlehandedly built up the operation, no
small feat, and served as manager, overseer, amateur doctor, magis-
tral and social missionary to his mostly illiterate workers. Sell 1
it remained that the collapse of the Andros Fibre Company had meant a
loss o1 ' for Neville's father as well as the stigma of an u
wise venture. But in sum, bo; i I rs agree that the Andros
adventure made Neville Chamberlain. MacLeod points out ' Andros
Fibre C I ve I ted, but Chamberlain did not. ' ros
strengthei and he left a man in: I I of a youth, wiser, more
10
self-reliant but also more tolerant." The more moving statement
comes, though, from Feiling:
Initiative had become a habit, for with him
alone it had rested, and confidence in his o i
'gement. . . Sens i t i ve and self-dependent, self-
respecting and sanguine, he had gone out to
11
Andros, and the same, doubly, he returned. 11










' Powerfully we must conclude, Andros ov '
tie si d of his vi i I ue, g i ving
him a dislike of anything untidy, ov
darkening for him the incompetence of
humanity en mass e, and imparting to
energy an unreflective turn, so that a day
without incessant oction seemed a d
wasted. '2
Confident, energetic, wise, duty-bound and filled with oth<
y virtues, he returned to lingham. Chamberlain was cwenty-
and had yet to enter public life either as a bv , nan or a
politician. For the next fourteen years, though, he would be cau
up in the explosic t was the city of Birmingham. Behind lay
ad'/ tried and failed and vast lone-: lers a
sometimes si nglemindedness which was to so mark Chamberlain's Foreign
Policy. William Rock cannot pass by the temptation to coi
Andros Island adventure with Chamberlain's later adventures in Br'
1 3foreign policy. Certainly the parallels are there: enthusiastic
pursuit of a goal, courage and tenacity and a rare ability to administer
Too, '.he results bore much the same stamp: en ultimate failure ti
should have been admitted earlier, in both cases to cut his losses.
Yet it is beyond this, in the loneliness of a childhood, thai might be
12
d. Perhaps the desire for incessant activity car, explain
in part his disdain for the Foreign Office and what remained of the
"old Diplomacy". The tidiness, v. ere it precision, might . ,een
a help in personal diplomacy, but the lack of patience
heavily against him, (See Harold Nicolson, Di plomacy York:
Oxford Univ. Press, \3<ok) , ch,V, for a well presented description
of the ideal diplomatist.)
13
Rock, Ch; lain, p. 30.

82
nd evei interesting parallels: his loneliness as a child
causing him to seek answers within himself, a trait that,
Minister, gave rise to talk of coldness and aloofnesSc On the other
hand, hi; pie. sure of being v/ithin the family circle later is re-
flected in the warmth he would show to his closest associates. And,
above all, there was the deeply imbued belief in duty, duty to family
and duty to "the people." From here, we trace two men, with the
moro stern visage always dominant.
With family connections, initial business opportunities came
easily. First director of a copper works, Chamberlain soon became the
owner of H skins and Son, a firm whose line of I . ci
struct, ion of metal cabin berths for ships. It was a small company,
Joying at its peak 200, though usually about half that ut it
was a steady, if not spectacular, financial success. Chamberlain i
successful and enjoyed "...the average life of a young publ ic-spi i i :
businessman." He became increasingly interested in social reform
and introduced a variety of measures to alleviate the problems of his
workers --a compensation scheme for injured workers, pension plan and
even went so far as to recognize the trade ent amongst his
workers
.








' With this interest and his bus in; erlain found
himself drawn into what would call civ: . By 1 90^4,
was aci n committees, two of which por
i
; uture:
dealings with hospitals and membership in the debating society. V
in the main, even his biographers have had a hard ti i th the years
to 191*+, for Chamberlain ",... would not commit introspection to pap:
en he once did so, during an unhappy time, later cut out I
page."
Still the bare bones of his life can be reconstructed: several
overseas trips including India, Burma, and Da 1 mat i a, a marriage in 191 i
at the age of ^+2, and flirtation on the outskirts < itics. Finally,
in the summer of 1911, he was elected to the 120~man City Council of
Birmingham V^ i thin thre< , rs he b al man, a- ithin Pour,
Lord Mayor — 3 rapid progress in any event, especially so for his
professed disinterest in politics.
The coming of the World War suspend rmal life for Birmin ham
and its Lord Mayor. Having put Birmingh a W3r-foot ing , he found
himself tapped by Lloyd George in 1916 to as Director of National
Service. The jump from first citizen of Birmingham to na1
politics was a long one, into the unknown and fraught with difficulties.
His biographers credit Chamberlain with the desire to serve, especially
in war, but in the longer view, his acceptance almost has the appear-






'ance of a whim. Yet, given Chamberlain's earlier life, action based '
rhlm would seem most unlikely. MacLeod reminds us that, "Admin-
istration always interested him far more than the mere game of
politics." id it was in administration that his abilities were
t concentrated. On paper --what there v/as of it-- the post of
Director of National Service was an administrative job. Perhaps this
more than anything led Chamberlain to accept.
For whatever reason, accept he did and fail he did. There were
errors on both sides. The Department had no charter and it seemed
that a definition of its duties would e , if at all, only as it
I o
pursued its V\ at functions the Department would ' . it
became quickly evident, would cut a swath through the responsibilities
of other Ministries. Tr.us, the fledgling I i tment with its neophyte
leader was almost guaranteed a cool welcome from the Whitehall family
ci rcle.
On Chamfc n's part, he failed to pi -es s Lloyd George for a
concise charter in the first weeks. When h did broach the
question, it was too late and too weak. Too, he surrounded himself
with a staff nucleus drawn from Birmingham acquaintances, most of
whom had little experience in national politics.
MacLeod, Chamber la? n, p. 131.
1
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Chamberlain groped throi le first months of his appointment, •
but by midsummer he began to think in terms of possible defeat. In
July, 1917, He .
Now I am in a position that reminds of the
Bahamas when the plants didn't grow. With all
the Depai ts aqaii and a chief wh
won't help, i see no chance of suet
By August, lie was determined to resign and die so on the eighth.
1
It h« I en a costly tenure, both in personal and political terms.
Politically, it marked the beginnings of a deep and sometii
acrimonious rift with Lloyd George. Personally, it was a F. Mure not
unlike the Bahamas: total, without compensation.
He returned to Birmingham and almost immediately d .! --at
nearly 50-- to stand for Parliament. As 1 won
handily and entered Parliament in 1919, at a later age in life than
20
any man who ever became Prime Minister. Once in Parliament, his
name aided in his not being relegated the very backmost of the
back-benches. For the next few years, he followed a path often
before trod, slowly upward through committee work, rumors of an under-
secretaryship and finally in 1922, the Cabinet-rank post of Post-
master-General. He also became a Privy-Councillor.
19
Feiling, Chamber lai n, p. /I.
20
Rock, Chamberlain
, p . 51.
2 1
Though this was a Cabinet- level office, it was normally
[not i n Cat) [net.
I

' Success began to come in other ways, too. Except for the U
Times and the local Birmingham papers, Chai in was unknown to
general public. His tenure as Director of National Services had been
too short to establish a public image— to his ultimate good. iow
he began to receive notice in popular magazines. As Minister of H
I, shortly later, Chancellor of (The Exch in the first Baldwin
Government (1923). he moved with confidence and ability. In th ond
Baldwin government (1924-29), he resumed his duties as Minister of
Health. His picture appeared in The Amei ; Review of Re in
December, 1924 and in 1925 he wrote an article for the Ai
on
:
More important, Chamberlain gained valuable insight into the
party politics that he had for so long avoided. Still, ' mained
to some an enigma. Even his best biographer, Feiling, feels con-
strained to devote a chapter at this point in an attempt "...to paint
him as he was." Feiling is not decidedly successful and perhaps
the most illuminating portion of the chapter is a portrait photograph
of Mrs. Chamberlain, a woman of aristocratic beauty that is only
occasionally found. We are told that Chamberlain became "...the
22
""Greatest Need of Local Government", Amar i.ean C '< 1 . 33 •
August, 1925.. pp. 1 25-;
23






•most self-contained and self-reliant of men." Indeed, pernap: in I
autocrat, dogged, but a first-class loser, "...a leader who fought
25
tor, and only, for causes, not fcr himself.""'
During a rkably successful tenure as Minister of H
had had ample opportunity to show his administrative talents. Too, he
had overcome his distaste for politics to the point where he began to
rge as an important influence in the Conservative Party. Yet there
was no Ch lain "clique," no band of devoted foil rs; he remained
lone ai lone.
In opposition after the Conservative defeat in 1929> Chamberlain
3me active ii p; y reorganization and reconstruction. Me serv
first as chairman of the Conservative Party Research Department and
then as party chairman. What emerged in the period bel i 1929 a
1931 was a party organization that became increasingly sensitive to
Chamberlain's touch. The payoff of this was to com.; in 1935, when
elections brought forth a Parliament wl rvative membership
owed much to Chamberlain. But in 1931 ; h 'ion was four years













I Chamberlain par I in the 1 thai led to the foi
i he National Government in August, 1931. He took the portfolio of
Minister of Health in a Government whos purpo'
national emergency.
The Gcven moved with surprising alacrity, but events ov<
tool, i s and it became quickly apparent that it. could only work
with public approval. After long,
especially on the tariff issue-- a National E on was held in
October, 1931. The results, in view of tt rgency, provided a
mandate for the ! I Government and its policies.
Chamberlain went to the Treasury in a Go
history heel been called, "...one long diminuendo." Yet he i
s that the best personality in the goveri leville
Chamber laii .
it was he who largely directed i tic
policies and more and more dominated i ;
Cabinet. In the day of the lesser as
outstanding, with his clear, c ivi 1 -service
mind, high principles, narrow but progressive





'C. L. Mowat, Britain Between the Wars, 19 '8-1 9^0 (Chicago:






' Chamberlain began to emerge as a strong man. Behind h
thorough organization of the C hinery, ahead lay
a paralysis of foreign policy to increasingly
3 growing power of Chamberlain. Clearly the mood of tl nties
was gone. The National Government was a r from internationalism
to concern with internal problems and domestic solutions. At first,
the government was in harmony with the n ial mood, bui
mood had changed, although the government had not. Throughout,
Chamberlain gained in power. "No aspect of politics could lie quite
outside the purview of a man who controlled both the nation's purse
trii Party c s thinki ng i hine. " "
By 1935; he could say, "As you will see i have become a sort of
Acting Prime Minister --only without the actual power of the Prime
30
Minister." ' If he hadn't the power of a Prime Minister, he was none-
theless formidable, so much so that in 193^ he began to deal in that
long-stagnant bog of foreign policy. His plan for "limited liability"
was defeated by
. MacLeod calls, "...the stonewalling of the
Chiefs of Staff and a formidable memorandum from Hankey, the Secretary
29
MacLeod, Chamber lain, p, 163- "I he Party thinking machine"
referred to the C. C. C. (Cabinet Conservative Committee), a high
level group that met more or less regularly to discuss Government








it Chamberlain hod proposed was, in essence, an internatic
pol ice force. The pi
...in the barest outl i ne. . . cons i sts of a mutual
guarantee by, say, Germany, France, Italy, UK,
Poland, and Czecho-S 1 ovaki a , under which, on
breach of the convention, each of the oth
signatories undertakes to put a limited
specified force at the disposal of the joint
body.
^
Thus, in 193^, Chamberlain was anything but hostile to the id
of collective security. Yet one must pause and wonder, how had
Chamberlain suddenly become an expert on foreign policy? What con-
s ion had pert i se 93 ine ' ' ,
turned politician into the labyrinth of fo policy?
seems to be not in his experience, of whi :h there was litl in
the failings of Baldwin and, in particul John Simon. The in-
effectiveness of Simon opened the way for Chamberlain who li ... could
,,33
not contemplate a problem without trying to solve it."'
Chamberlain came to power through the abdication of misuse of
it by others in the Cabinet. Not that he was without talent: we have
seen the contrary. The hesitating and irresolute attitudes of a Simon






Feiling, Chamber 1 a? n , p. 251.
33






me time, such wavering probably increased his d i -. of his co
leagues and cannot but have helped influence his later te
personal d i plomacy.
ironically, in 193^, Chamberlain was perhaps in the I Fi mt of
those warning of the German potential and advocating British rearma-
!
it. Increasingly he was called to comment upon foreign policy and,
as Simon's inadequacies became all too apparent, Chamberlain came under
consideration for the Foreign Office. Apparently, at one point t
1
choice seemed so logical that even Winston Churchill supported it.
In late 193^, the offer of the Foreign Ministry was discreetly
ide to him. He turned it down for a vai ! ty of i , the i ist
important being the amount of unfinish rk at the Excl nd
Chamberl in's desire to finish the job hii I For the ne ars
he would remain Chancellor, gradually expanding his power base and
slipping into the role of heir apparent.
While he watched and waited, two :n s occupied British
foreign policy: German rearmament and Aby ia. The British reac-
tion to both actions was curious. On the one hand, she continued
*, bid
3^







'to rearm, at least on paper;'' on the otl Lain sought to mak'
deal with Hitler. The Anglo-German naval agreement of June, 1935 '
deal. What role Chamberlain had in formulation of t! _nt
is not stated, but his role as chief architect of the Dei White
Papers of 1936 and 1937 seems to show that he was heavily involved in
37
Defense as well as Foreign Affairs matters.
As it became more apparent that he would in all probability
succeed Baldwin as Prime Minister, foreign policy began to attract
more and more of his attention. In I began writing of the
failures of collective security. Bu June 10, when he spoke of the
190C Cli : i ng c 1 : on of inia,
"...the very midsummer of madness."''
it was during this time that the I or in Chamberlain
came clearly to the fore. The direct method won out over consulta-
tion. On a few days before the June speech referred to abc
Anthony Eden had assured Commons that no charge was forthcoming in
the government, policies. At the very least, Chamber I « embar-
rassed Eden. More importantly, he had signaled what was to become
a hallmark of the Chamberlain method, what might be called today the
Military estimates were \ rejected at % 50 million spread over
five years, with an increasing emphasis on the RAF. (Rock, Chamber la in ,
p. 3k.)
37MacLeod, I '-lain







11" method. There was the upshot lonely schoolboy,
on Andr >s, the days spent learning administrative skills all coming
her. it his methods would be, from now on, irregular; at
st, they would be behind the bock. But, his reasoning s<
clear to him.
I did it deliberately because I felt that the
party and the country needed a lead, and an
indication that the government was not waver-
ing and drifting without a pol icy. 39
The drift of policy was, in part, now corrected. At the outset
of the decade Britain faced three alternatives in int onal af-
fairs: collective security, alliance, end isolation. Chamberlain
had eliminated the first and would waver bet. the last two i
the mid 1933-
As tl iths spun themselves out to 1937> Britain found her
insularity more and more challenged by the deterioration of relations
between the continental : i : , by the continuation of the Abyssinian
crisis arid by the outbreak of the Spanish civil war. In May, 1 937
*
Chamberlain came to power. It was a "bureaucratic formality", as
Will iam Rock puts it.
39




Rock, Chamber! ai n, p. 111.
J

' The on r, the rr. :
the helm. He had istry t ! teady
tion. Clearly, his utilitarian* 1 solving
serve well the domestic needs of the country, but its efficiency
in international relations was certainly open to question.
To this point the attempt has been to single out several traits
that, in the era of personal diplomacy Follows, are of critical
importance in assessing Chamberlain's acti Ei lipped to war.
The childhood influence of "doing it alo; 1 ed consistent re-
inforce in Chamberlain's business and public life. His failures
at Andros and the Notional Service would only have intensified his
desires to suceed. His distrust of others was only heightened by t
seei . | iocrity I and govei ; - col-
leagues. Finally, his desire for incessant action could only portend
changes in foreign policy.
Yet it is fail to ask, how much lee\ left by 1937? On
the British :,ioe
;
Chamberlain had all but formally abandoned League
of Nat i ens while espousing a policy of rearmament and reconciliation
that were in many ways incompatible. He was constricted by the actions
of the other Powers. Unwilling to accept alliances, yet reluctant to
retreat into isolationism, Chamberlain trod a narrow path, literally
seeking to:
V/alk between dark and dark --a shining space




r ^ ~i' ce.
Thus he was constricted on the one hand by his : liefs and
i i-natic; it nation, sin had !
control than she believed. T he 19th century in Chamberlain livec!
beyond its us< Ful i< s. Set against the 20th century dictators, his
ideals and ods seemed even more out of date than they were.
i
It is easy to forget today, though, that his ideals were in the
main those of England at large. Peace was uppermost in English mind
perhaps to the extent that peace at almost any price was not an un~
fair comment on the state of British thought.
Cha i did not, like a 1930'; ler , crusade alone
for his causes. What came to be called appeasement was / ap-
proved. Margaret George devotes chapters to both instil is and
k?
organizations that supported appeasement. Public opinion was
agreement. Chamberlain felt he had a wid .. of support and, with
complete control of Parliament and the Cal must also have felt
that he could easily handle any opposition. Until 1939. he was more
correct than even he might have anticipat
Robert Graves, Col lected Poems (London: Cassell, 1965),
p. 63.
hi






ill i in mind, it becoi sier Lo ;•
Cabinet Minister turned Prime Minister undertook to be the Govern-
ment's chief diplomat. The mechanics, in retrospect, seem simple
>gh. Chamberlain had been in foreign policy long enough to rec
nize where the centers of opposition were. One of these.,
seen in the previous chapter, was in the Foreign Office. The taking
of the Foreign Office occupied the fir;. months of his Premiership.
Believing that his double policy of rearmament and better relations
with Germany and Italy would work, "...if only the Foreign Office
wi 1 1 play up, l: matically eliminated the ant i -German element
Vansittanl il to a I iorific (and liti e) post, Phipps
was replaced rlin by the more malleable Henderson, < i was
cornered b
When Fden left, he was replaced by Halifax and the -nal
Zei tung proclaimed that the fortress of the F Office h ; len
to the appeasers. There was more truth than lie in this ar.d it
became evident in the handling of the Czech crisis. The policy line
to be taken was formulated by Chamberlain, dictated by him a




Fe i 1 i ng , Chamber! ain , p . .119.




Conveniently , Hal was a I upon CI '-lain
to defend I I icy in the Hou: is. Man and Policy
become one in the eyes of tl s of Commons. Ever so gi lly,
yet firmly, Foreign Policy came to i at 10 Downing Street.
s.mti formulating and defending Foreign Policy at home to negoti-
ating abroad was not so long a step as might be im< I. Party
politics securely under control, the Foreign Office subdued and :
major organs of opinion such as The Time s openly advocating appease-
i, it seemed only logical that its leading practitioner should be-
come its leading negotiator.
A:- a's la: "e on, trie crisis tang lee
retangled. Britain and France sought refuge in words nciman
mission. When all else failed, The Times solved the pi i on
Sen r 7th by a leader that advocated the cession of the Sudet
area. Tl was a prompt denial from the Foreign Office that the
article had official support, which was probably true, in so far as
46
the Fo r s i qn Office we n t
.
The role of The Times is thoroughly and candidly dir cussed in
The H i stor y of The Times, Vol IV, part 2 (London: Printing House
Square, 1352). See also George, The Warped Vision, ch. X.
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Northedge, Troubled Gian t, p. 52.4.
L J

I But no . >rd --supported i
wou 1 d be paid. It pay and pay in
that. That pe ,otiati was in his
The Ti tide of September 7th : i imily letter
3rd says, i n
,
I keep rocking my brain to try and -
means of averting a catastrophe ..! |ht of
one so unconventional and dar: at it rather
i. -,
took Halifax's breath away. +/
irlain was poised for .ction of his career.
But, c 69, having been in political life 20 years, how well
equipped was he to face a who Feiling describes as: "Born and
-'8
brad in resentment against squalid circum ."
To those characteristics we have met so far --the ambitioi
acquired . ' F. lily and the loneliness bred there, a the zeal
for efficiency and tidiness and the consummate skill as politician
and administrator-- must of necessity be added the ease with which he
handled power. The months in office, the. victories won, especially
-
i le Foreicn Office, had increased his self-confidence; the
personal pronoun crept more and more into his letters and diary
entries. He was confident that public opinion supported him and sure












He was surrounded by like-: . his :.osing (i
ing one of t National Sei - content to hear his
views echoed. This innei group, Chamberla i ni tes , were unabashedly
men of p Churchill, Cooper or Avery wanted-- and they
little use for confronting force, guile ickedness. OP them --
Sim n, Hoare, Wilson and Halifax-- A. L. Bowse has said:
That they did not know what tl 'ere dealing
i th is most charitable explanation of their
failure; but they might... have taken the trouble
to inform themselves. .. they all on-
conformist origin, and its che If-
ousness --ail the more intol
i pably wrong .^9
Hugh Dal ton is 1 kind with Chamber 1 im of being,
all times, stubborn and self-sufficient, "in regard to Foreign
Affairs, he was, in addition, inexperienced, gullible and ill-in-
50
formed." Yet it is within this matrix decision for perse
diplomacy was made. A less self-suff icien might ' ied
at all, one more so might have entered war at a time even less
advantageous for Britain than 1339-
^9 /
A. L. Rowse, Appea sement: A Study in Political D ec = i ne (New
York: Norton, 1963), p- 19-




V/hen Chamberlain v.ent to Bercl
extensive concessions to the S l-German i even to I
i
int of accepting, in princi self-
determination. At the s had n< ctions to seeing the
Czechs deprived of treaty relat ips with France and
Russia in exchange for neutralization and some kind of international
guarante He sa w no priety in d< third count
arguments about sovereignty notwi thstandi i
Here then was a man who knew little ho was ignorant




j businessman," in iii
had professed no interest in politics, suddenly determined that he
could solve the unsolvable and bring peace to Europe. What
engendered this belief? The answer can be. d in the i
self-made man, unsure in the higher world, but finding strength in
his ability to stand alone. Chamberlain « the Victor!
in reality carrying part c( it with him always. He was a prisoner
of his class and eminent sensibility. In truth he was:
5
1
Donald M . Lamme r s , Expl ai ninq Munich: The Se a rch for Motive
in Br i tish Pol icy (Stanford, California: Hoover Insti 'ar,









I Between two worlds, r , '
The other pc
He had many good quali<< tainly rated a kinder epil
than that put upon him by Lloyd George, "A good Loi r of Birmi
i n a 1 ean yea r . " Ye t he 1 aci a t i on wh i ch cou 1 d have f i t ted
gaps of inexperience. Duff Cooper soi o explain jrlain 1
failures by suggesting that the former Lor r of Bi ham
viewed the dictators of Germany and Italy, "...like th r of
Liverpool and M ster, who might afferent political
parties and have different interests, but who must desire the welfare
55
of humanity, and be fui ally reasonable decent men like hi r."
It was hard to 1 i ror in this thinki i cially if ore
English in 1938 and 1S39- Chamberlain was the essence of Wilsonian
diplomacy, open convenants openly reached in its most Ii1
His Victorian belief system, reinforced by his individualistic appro'
to life and scarcely modified by the t< that had brought
Hitler nearly astride Europe, provided hi honorable tools when,
as Duff Cooper would say, what was nee; 1 ; the mailed fist.
Denys Thompson, ed. Matthew Arnol d : Selected Poem s and
(New York: Barnes', Noble, 1971), P- 86.
5>+
As quoted in Rowse, Ap peasement
, p. 103.




I1 This belief sy: was confir >r Chamberlain by f
him, his inner circle, "The Big Four" and echoed by Geoffrey D
anc' The Ti mes. As was shown in C 1
,
the o s divi
and lacked ore, ion, 1 ;trident voic
in the wilderness or made up of characters in some ways not unli
Chamberlain's, that is to say so individualistic as to be unable
i
form a united front against appeasement.
Too, Chamberlain felt he reflected public opinion. In this, he
was probably correct --to a point. Certainly no on
question : one would go to avoid war. Even 30 plu:
of app- . lit. a en
56
found. This, perhaps simpl istically , be becau: . what
was meant by appeasement. Perhaps there \ ions.
It would be fair to say that many sectors of British public opini
Chamberlain included, expected more from app nt than it was
capable of providing.
Clearly, appeasement was idealistic. It thus fitted well into
the British approach to international problems, which has been
characterized by Harold Nicolson as moving always from the idealistic
57
to the realistic. Chamberlain brought to appeasement personality








again citing Nic >n to i
included (1) considerable ignorance of foreign psychology, (2) a
ing unpleasant possibilitie nee, and (3) a
.dericy to vol come t\ ctions nd
no real validity, ore calcul to appeal to the sentiment
58
the British public and their love of c: i ng phi
A seemingly logical policy became allied with m posse
those traits. It is all well and good to exclaim . does,
53
"the inexhaustible vanity of the disastrous- old man," there
is more then that meager truth in saying that man and policy fitti
the of Britain. The flaw in CI
but his reluctance to seek alternatives when his offerlnj
cessful. That he could • nati Id have
been predicted I is psychological belief system, jusl could
have his predilection for face-to-face ne ions.
Since those face-to-face negotiate >t avoid war,
Chamberlain, prima facie, failed as a diplomatist. Yet given t











Fly summarized as (I) a ! /a-'
1 in regard to the prevail ii
wealthy, contented power, (2) a tacit assumption th ic issu
>1 i t ice mere ly di
essenti ngs of a demand i t, and (3) the domestic see;
re specifically, ll : al gri the rise
of the Lai jr Party, that came to dominate British ics in I
in'. tod. These factors, two old and one new, put a continuous
60
strain on British resources. As has been sug h century
'.. 1: me to grief on 20th century re; ; : , ---, , Britain no Ion
r to attend to the first two i its and satisfy domesti
clamoring, and awoke too late to alleviate the fad oui
in particular naval and economic strength, where inadeqi i de
a counterbalance to German expansion. Chai in thus the
admittedly limited alternative of seeking acci Lion wil
s reality conflicted with the historical logic c ign
P(
"
; cv, the maintenance of the Balance of I . By accepting, in a
businesslike sense, the limitation of his is, Chamberlain
reflected a 20th century attitude. His fails. s negotiate his
options in a sufficiently hardheaded manner can be laid to a combina-
tion of f he weakness of those options and his 19th century outlook.
Northedqe, Troubled G iant , p. 620 and following for a detailed




If appeasement was to fly in the face of t , 1 logic of
British Fi Policy, it f< ; row Chamberlain
into conflh h the I i 'vice (se 2). (
Chamberlain's limited circle of friends and his difficulty in m
new ones, and opposing t h i r that conflict, it he r
lain his reluctance to have Foreign Office official mpany
Kim on his trips or to accept their advic
His di| lomacy, then, was to be pla\ !i-
out supporting actors, a device theatrically impressive, but dependent
solely upon the skill of the actor ai recept i veness of
audience. The actor's skill \ that of
his colleagues. Others n have sought to decor. ie, but
in trul iittle with which to inge Hitler.
hamberlain /ed to an audienc one: Adolf Hitler. It is
ps slighting to dismiss the Becks and the E the Daladiers
and the Dalherus', but the truth of the ma1 s that from Chamberlain's
decision to seek a solution in personal diplomacy, the struggle focused
on the dictator and the democrat. Perhaps only Napoleon and C h r i
have been described in more detail than Hitler, but one of Halifax's
observations made on his famous 1937 trip shows graphically the
problems Chamberlain would face in 1939:
61
But no less excusable] By avoiding criticism, ' / I
inforced the belief in his own system. Gradually. > "hoe'
on his own beliefs, resisting changes in a reflex manner.
L

One had a feel • 1 I the ; da
total ly d i f fere:
spe in a different langi not
onl \ the d i f fere nee .n
and democratic state, he i i on
of feeling that whilst tie had to
we r only '
realities, the British Cover ill
living comfortably in a wor 1 its ov ng,
a fairy lend of sti if respectable, illus-
ions. 62
know that, by Chamberlain's own admissions, he sought in tl
63
face-to-face meetings with Hitler a "coup". He was "bent on finding
64
decency in even dictators". Yet was it vanity --Rowse calls hii
65
"vein old fool" -- that sen to Berchstesgaden or was it m
the sense c |C duty that had so long ! 11 mark of the CI
It seems the latter, a sense of duty so stn el i
realities the situation. Chamber, no less we
than his friends --or opponents-- to deal with Hitler. For all their
fiery retrospects, what might have A. L. Rowse, Leo Amery or ev
Churchill done to deter Hitler? But that is beyond this paper;
rather we must continue by examining what Chamberlain was I lo do.
6?













1 The ; >e advantages lay wi th Hi tier. > him,
Chan in would later raise the 'on of Britain a
It i ning for Chamberlain to fly wards and \n
allies and friends and a did is junior. Still,
"Charn- ; insisted that prestige should not stand in tl , of
66
any expedient to ward off the unbearab he of war".
Chamberlain and Hitler spoke, literally, no common language. The
translate; ,, as Chamber lei n negotiated alone.
over, and more important, there was questionable in the pro-
cess of two soverign nations dealing away a third. Increasingly it
de to . i te the d< ' in
had personally "sold" Czechos lovakia to th is.
Ch i'erlain's diplomacy had yet another result, in th ig run
one that perhaps overshadowed even the whol .:h question. Y
was the engagement of Britain directly in the is a focu< :
upon her of the question as to whether it i 3 settled by force
or negotiation. And in that question the issue of ap; lent
became entangled and eventually went to ground.
When Chamberlain went to Berchtesgaden, he clearly thought in
terms of settling the crisis by personal diplomacy. His belief
system would have engendered such an approach even if he ha : possessed





the military strength to back up a stronger approach. He was - / '
s interested in the Sudeten problem --". n opinii
on principle, I didn't care two hoots whetl s in





oach was businesslike and in keeping with his back-
g'round. And yet if we are to believe Sir I stern
critic of Chamberlain, this was the approach t
diplomatist might take:
...the foundation of good diplo
same as the fou ion of good busi:
namely credit, confidence, co
and compromise
So Chamberlain was on se ly safe ground here. i
solutions in compromise, within what might be called the ' ' of
the market.pl ace •.. the relation is between and seller. Yet,
t v/as the object of negotiation? Clearly not the Sudeten Germans,
or even tl i idei stion of Czechoslovakia and Central Europe?
more important, ' as the buyer and who the seller? ers
this In terms of Chamberlain's beliefs, the object of negotiation
would be British security within the framework of improved Anglo-
67




D.3.F.P., vol 2, nos. 895 and 896, both dated 15 nber,
69
Ni col son, D j p loma cy , p. 77-

109
man relations --a 1 ' I and in ed 1 . How
could anything so eminently c /? Th
s lies iii the perception of the ney »ne
assumes the ethos of the market
;
r-
sellei develops. It is proposed to
negotiate with hi tier within such a frame
1 to enter the marketplace of negotiation rendered Ch 's
diplomacy ineffectual. Chamberlain, for his part, was so constraii
his belief sy I as to be blind to alt.
obvious his approach was failing. His continued ad Lo belief
in an essentially moral program of appeasemen n it had become
eked i ie reality of Hitler's e;
the Prirc Minister himself to lose touch wi 1
that he discovered too late that policy nv rid on power.
Much lias been made of Chamberlain's individualism, or .onity,
as his detractoi .'Id suggest. It is evident in his negotiations
with hitler. Moreover, given the same cl teristic, only bet
developed, in Hitler, Chamberlain came off a poor second. And, it
would seem evident that Hitler did play upon Chamberlain's vani
witness the Prime Minister's pleasure upon hearing from H son






' speaking to Yet for all kept
sight ( : fact that he must consult
making a Joel:, ion. His individualism \ the
Br i : of go
imberlain led the first meetings with Hitler seeking
to improve British security while Hitler sought the more immediate.
Hitler dismissed the idealistic approach of Chamberlain: "But all
-i i
this seems academic, I want to get down to realities". ailing
Nicolson's comment about the typical British approach to any i.
national problem as one from the idealist' the realistic, it
becomes evident that the negotiati began 1 poles. A
rong case can be made for idealism going to grief when I by
ality and I len \ no exception. Che ;
Hitler to have goals not un il his own. He v/as willing to make
immediate concessions to get through to what he perceived as "a m
72
who could be relied upon when he had give: 1." Hitler,
' D.B.F.P
.
, vol 2, no. 897, 16 September 1938. Though nitid-
is supposed to have later said, when speaking of the declaration he
and the Prime Minister had signed at Munich, "Mr. Cha is
such a rice old man, and 1 have signed so i books,
that 1 thought ! would give him my signature . a pleasant s( ir."
(Conversation between Mr. Aston-Gwatki n and Or. Schacht reported in










I unconstrai lity, gave hi ly
and would 1 iter disregard it jus*" as freely. Bu ting phrases
were w in Britain, and for a while irsh n ies.
In all C Iain's negotiations with Hitler he was unsupported
by criticism. The expert i: might ha\
in balancing out Che in's views had he been willing to listen.
His desire Lo be constantly busy caused him to seek i : sions
to wh : ; critical problems. By se
to seemingly unrelated problems, he missed th" chance to do he
truly des i red : secure Britain and, incideni Europe from war.
Subsequent to Ber / Hit:
again: once, in a series of meetings at Godesberg and finally on
interspersed were seve binet meetings
at home and a series of talks with the French as well as Sir Horace
Wilson's approaches to Hitler on September 26th and 27th. Th
numerous opportunities were available for Chamberlain to for-
all ves to Hitler.
Thai he did not s .. alternatives suggested that eiti re
were none or that he still felt appeasement and negotiation would
succeed. While his personality would suggest the latter, it must be
stated that Chamberlain's alternatives were, in truth, few.
J

German policy was essentially k" or o " policy." '
The implementation of thi in the idea that force 01
73
of F< ce are the main instruments of ne<j ion. In th
past, Britain's insularity had allowed her to devel foreign
:
w i t h little regard to that of other countries. Her ii
the Continent was --even in World War On- respon ific
cases. She usually maintained no residual presence





Britain, for all practical purpo rhaps withe 1 •
izing It, became a part of the Continent, ; the conceptualiza-
tion of a technological Europe. icy of Gei
Britain could not coexist. One had, of necessity, to yield to the
othei British poi icy being tl il (yet not < logic),
Ided before the state who put its own needs above th <: id-
uals. This does not argue the correctness of one or the other, ral
it suggests that the response to "power policies," especially when
those policies are in the hands of people such as Hitler, must of
necessity be couched in the same terms. This Britain could not do,
even had Chamberlain been so disposed, by 1 937
-
Thus, Chamberlain inherited a bit of a mess. But he made no
attempt to correct this himself, so he must take part of the blame
for Britain's continued weakness. in the final analysis,




was w 'i a try. That it \ ionab1<
It is here that Chamberlain's personality i
He held to appeasement after Munich, wh. to
a wide cross section of people. In this, if we arc to be Rock,
lid "a great disservice to the English people in delucJ'
the real nature of the Nazi menace."
It would be debatable as to whether his cont; nee to
hindered re: nt, but t' ility suggests
the possibility. Certainly if Chamber la !
n
his policies,
others also wan i and thus they put as tior, ing when a
irou have i nj ec ted a sei
policy or at least underscored the necessity of meet
i
of f . the threat of re Ion.
If Britain was not going to change her policy, tl imberlain
had nothing to counter Hitler with exce| lal arguments. Bui
large amount of ity and the smallest possible ; of force
had for so long been a part of British policy rl in alone,
can hardly be blamed for not realizing its l, icy. I is
'Stic opponents sought in collective security a i : I Citish







.Thus Chamberlain n y
'
after Berchtesgaden that could only lead I
taught him --and I ional British diplc I some:.
of the marketplace would prevail, A c • ; i se be
r and seller mi | ; b 1 e , exc II-
ing what was not his and Hitler, in no moc I ook, knowing that
i
Chai in could do little else save express moral indi ion. As
on Andros Island m »rs before, the reprehensible thing was
hang on so '; Fter failure was so clear. But the loss this time
was ly money.
Ch: le one more excursion into ; ;
before the outbreak of war. In early J i /, he and ' yed
to Rome in a visit to Mussol ini
;
the obi i n~
elude specific agreements, but rather to produce, through
contacts, closer understanding between the two countries of their
75
respective points of view."
The talks ran from the 11th to the I of January, covering
the entire range of Anglo-
I
tal ian relations. There was apparently
• 76
no agenda and the conversations vvanoerec) from topic to topic
^D.B.F.P. , vol 3, no. 502, encl. 5, 15 January 1939-
Details of the visit and discussions are covered in . P.
,
vol 3- nos. 495, ^99, 500 and 502.
L

There wore general :ons to pt though i
opening declaration Mussolini stated tl found
t not to be practical politics. ' in spoke next, que
iolini about the Jewish refugee problem and <
opening statement. As if to verify st; 5 to hi
vanity, Chamberlain spoke of his d nt of resul
of h_[s (italics mine) careful finance . diss: in
77
i t. In fact throughout the conv .on, there is a strong
sense of the "I", reinforcing a feeling that Ch eg inning
to act more and more on his own without to his Cabinet or
ge fron
was consulted as a matter of course. On Ron
talks • no specific agreements and . I early not
the di. hat Hitler was.
77 \bj_6., no. 500, part 1, 11-14 Janu
In the case of Commons, Rock (in he
Prime Minister's statement of December 19th, 193
_-i'i>
vol, 3^2, coU 2517-8) as proof that he placed his
British opinion above anything said in Con For example:
"I have been getting a great numbar of letters which convim
that the country does not want th= policy (appec
and • I -vcr views may be expresssd in tie ise, I am s<






Th< with the , .li-
•ons and c pel ja las. I n tl,
vi si ts , t he enthus iasm peo|
79
; n. Crowds thronged to
; ned a open reception from the Italian people. The British
Ambassador, summing up the visit, report nbers of the
assy have seen many demonstrations in honour of visiting statesmen,
but the I an occasi he people welcoi
the >fs so spent i ;ly and in such a h I." Cf-v ain
could not have helped equating the italianch 'ith his own be s i
<.
,
at home, "public desire" was with his effc - gain prcce
. ough a -men t.
Yet when the i was
thout substance, the talks were shadows. Again the British found
the words ! to hear and little else. Again a dictator
made a few gestures, forgotten almost at the - t. In the after-
noon, Ch Main left Ren": by train, in hi awn words, !:
O I
convinced of the good faith and good-will of the Italian Government."
79And Count Ciano as well, v/ho wrote: "The welcome of I owd
was good, particularly in the middle-class section of the city, where
the old man with the umbrella is quite popular." (Macolrr ridge,
ed., Ciano's Diary (London: Heineman, 19^+7) > P- 8.)
80





I h i s 1 a ; t coi his 1 <
empt at personal diplomacy. In both cases, with Hitler sncl
Mussolini, he seemed satisfied with the r^
id bar'.; hoslo th Mussolini done little
hange generalities. In both cases, though, he felt tha
dictators were men who could keep theii d this
t
because he would most naturally keep his v Chambei
thought they might have blatantly lied to him surfaces no \ in
either Foiling or MacLeod.
In conclusion, one might ask two ions about Chamberlain
attempts diplc Why, ults?
answer as to "why" must: remain conjecture to some degree, bui:
material available suggests that Chamberlain acted in accordance with
a belief system that was rooted in the busi: hos. These ' ' ef-
face negotiations promised immediate solutio .ok the measure of
the man and suggested sincerity that might not be present in the
exchange of notes. Chamberlain failed to cast his o, its as oth,
than mi rror- images of himself. He assumed their coals, in the long
run, to be the same as his, placing with them the same value of
personal diplomacy as he held. Some of the "why" lies in Chamberlain's
individualistic approach ':o life, an approach that did in fact boi
on vanity. Being self-reliant, he seldom sought the advice of others
and when he did it was usually from a cin I like-minded friends.
There existed no counterpoise to his ambition, especially in foreign

Ppolicy; he n efficient man, highly <
to decisions quickly and with a min
of hi s pei 1 i ty could only I
ith the Axis dictators. In : ;ne lc ially in
the Anglo-Italian discussions, for suggestions that Cham
igotiating in the name of His Majesty's Gov
As to the result of Chamberlain's personal di] y, the an
first glance seems to be that since it failed, its results were non-
existent or nc e. If Chamberlain im, dictators wil
his sincerity, the v. of his argum .ertainly moved the
little. Hitler's sole admitted concession to C. rlain was to
modify the timetable of the Munich £ mtns. If i belie
A. L. Rowse, Hitler thought of CI
Count Ciano reports Mussolini as having said of Ch.
men ate not made of tl stuff as ...
are the tired sons of a long line of rich .. ill lose
go
their empire." So it seems evident that CI ' n had little
effect upon either dictator except to rein tl in
did not wi sh to • .
Aside from the Munich Agreement and an equally worthless Anglo-
ration on consultation, Chamberlain's personal diplomacy
Rowse, Aj ^, p. S3
Mugger idge. Ciano's Diary, pp. 9-10. Ciano did admit though
[that, "Old Chamberlain is a pleasant fellow..." (p. 11).

ocluced no alliance ag i in
rtion of peace. Negatively, h
a t ime when it might have I
Perhaps the greatest value in Ch
y in tl itrast it woul tors' : actions.
Here would be hypocrisy at its height: solemn, assurances ignored
or casl ide. Chamberlain's personal diplomacy set th<
into tru erspective and, ironically, expos tcy of
; easement . Whatever the implications o
diplomacy, its value, never high, evap t as quickly as
d him in R
For bettor or worse, no further overtures to
made by Chamber laii i ter the Rome tri| l"hus, personal d
uld I e no immediate role in the drift to war tl
Prague. Perhaps it had played the only i could by March
iroviding a stark contrast to th s of the dictators
and exposing more clearly the magnil ean




THE INTERACTION OF DEFENSE AND FOREIGN POLICY
prepared for this
prepared in
prepared for no war at all."
--Hanson Ba
By late 193^» the impending failure of the Dis
coupled with Germ openly avowed intentions to rearm broug
urgency to the qu. was to be
Tightly linked, if not inseparable, problem of settl in<
foreign policy that could effectively blui lynamisi
to the searcl med to lie in reai
rearmament it expenditures the Govet (end Britons generally)
: 1 1 i ng to make.
But w! r Bi itaii ; to maintain her trancli reign
policy of a minimum of interference on the Continent in maintenam
of a balance, of power or to choose collective security,
required to rearm her depleted military arsenal to provide a credible
deterrent. Thus, pacifists and some Laborites aside, t! stion
became not one of . or or not
:
but how much. In the answer ulti-
mately would rest Britain's secuiity and, more imr . the
directions open to foreign policy. !t seems app the




many, the inability of f lickly co io a c-
defensr I icy insure;
ment would be, at be si
The failure to idequati i policy cac\ be traced
to the question mament, in turn, i lii ' to
ance end, in p . , to tl ,y. Wl ;-y
Is and plans of the interwar years, it was the Exch
ninded concern for economy that were th
itish defense policy.
In 1936, past defense policy could be : as being moti-
I by as cted. Thi s reel i ng
had carried over from the twenties when the p
enduring. One major result was a military e;
materially and philosophically unprepared
In 1936, Britain had just co^e face-to- 1 with reality in
land. Yet foreign policy is harder to c jit of
clothes and military policy takes longer still to < Dt-
too-di stent memories of the "ten-year assumption" weighed heavily in
1 tit was unprepared was not the fault of at least one gro
within Britain. See Robert Higham, The Mi 1 itary li
Britain: 1919-1939 (New Brunswick, N.J.: R
>)• Cadogan he Foreign Office view well in 193o when he said,
"Our unilateral disarmament in the period of security imn tely
er the war was followed by failure to secure international agree-
ment for disarmament and this in turn by failure to rearm in good





Th it ion" had proposed, in 1919
for ten y 1 , in
1932, 1 "t 1 to Britain ' s
military ucture. At first, its demise changed little, lc
all tl I proce of the policy framers. I the 1',
2
Defense White Papers that finally broke the log •• .
The 1936 Hef White Paper w< >f rearmament
in had made the beginnings of litary exp
sion os early as 193^- >e were tentative initiative .
more com] 1 : offered, which inclu ie first
5
pi; n for re. nt in the air, ! F. ense expenditures,
some 13 mill h inds sterling in 193! to 1 85 1 ill ion
in 1936 (s^<^ were projected to 62.6 million in 1938).
also ted to balance out service spending, which
had been long dominated by expenditures on th .'. Yet, as Table
One shows, it was not until 1938 that money ' for the R.A.F.
M. It. I 'os tan, British War Production (London: HMSO, 1952),
P . 1.
'"Statement Relating to Defense", Cmd 5107 (1936).
h















( i n mi 1 1 i ons of pounds sterl i
i
"1
Source: Postan, British War Pro p. 12.
exceeded that spent for the Navy. ! sfve as the program was, it
came late in the d .he threat from Germai
easily contained had England waited so long to recognize the
threat?
A principal reason can be found in tl ion
with disarmament after Versailles. Even < y publicly an-
noun ced its intentions to rearm, the British man- in-the-str<
"loath to in1 the dream of disan s over."
a refusal, perhaps subconscious, to admit that the days of I
in the search for a modus vi vend i ware over for 193^>
she would have to weigh her effectiveness as a power in a ion
7
No r t hedge , Trot I G jhant







With allies --or in opposition to ei nt in-
cre.
Reluctantly, the Governi ecogni
deterrent. If 1936 gave n:_ ction to ;e policy, it was in
the jumble of 1 d for first showed 1
1935 Defense Paper was the first to set forth the reasons
i
which made rearman -cessary. Its thru: more . than
Q
.live. Regrettably, the paper, coui vision
to increas length of conscription servic
ty to announce the reinst i tution c ription i
in an atmospl eed to provol only minimal rccri i
democrac ies.
,ds success, and the moral lecturing by Britain and
France onl^ ved to in i Germany. Hitler's prestige cn-
i ced by the decision to reintroduce c n i ion --the fir:
renunciation of a clause of the Versailles Treaty-- he impotence
of the other s and the League were made all too a
c
'"Statement Relating to Defense", Cmd ^827 (1935).
o
Northedge, Troubled Gia nt. The author points out that the
proposed increase in defense expenditure was only
the final figure was closer to ]? 23. (Higham, Armed Forces, p. 327).
L

I Against the wider ian I
jeneral deter on of
the Baldwin government sought to recon and p m.
befon rtunity o1 . The
ineland, in turn, g le to gi 'pain.
Throughout, I d much, did littl- >ping to ride out wl
thought to be a temporary storm.
The 1936 Defense Estimates clearly reflect this thought. As has
been suggested, the estimates were, in truth, a bold departure fr<
past policies, a r iti ntial viable
fore ign pol i Yet th • 5 to the pa|
ex; pie, there were no firm dates for pr( complel and a
statem t ti . nt must not 1 n of norm
trade. T is, reiWi s to be carried out in a !, peacetime
ile the hurried pace of Hitler' ion daily increased
the threat of war.
The drift and vagueness were to continue almost to the doorstep
of war. As Postart points out, "Unti'l well into 1938 the objects of
rearmament were too uncertain, and on the too political, to
ke it possible for the Services to embark on direct preparations
for war."
10




I 1 s " 1
1
narrovv coi i Main fus id d i s-
inte rests of a Baldwin" led
League was invoked in public end decried in p the Conserva-
es espoused a policy of deceit. sit?
thus it was at first not done and, later, only half-heartedly in s
=' mannei assure its inadequacy.
But it v 1 93* ; the beginning of change. The trend of
what has he "rec . econoi in
1
2
names of dis< 2nt by of orthodox fir ' s at 1-:
::nt g r h : f ted f re
mental 3 a prewar one. I 1: was now up to the gov.: t< instill
in the populat i on a : would al
1
proceeed on a scale large > h to give Britain a en I terrent.
Further, the gov ve to get inl matter itself,
sp- illy by 1 ' ng an active role in t mic 1H
count ry.
The government did neither well and thus deprived Foreign policy
of the leverage that would have been inherent in a strong defense
policy based on deterrence. In the first case, they were reluct;




m > Armed Forces , p. 285- ,

127
I f \ to bel ieve Man 33,
i n wl i
.
gain o1 nted Baldwin. ' r
t
Baldwin av(
opinion by avoiding the inherent risks in standi . any positi'
pol icy.
As to the need for t nment to .
role of bystander in economic matte: i an act. le in
executing the rearmamen c plans, i '. int
it in U of i ing the noi I at ions
2 one hand and the
hand. it thus p. I no impetus or gu
i
industries to encouracje the to plan for expanded p. ion in
case of w;
These factors combined a technological revolution, which
called for at least five years in which to
from 1S1 ; ; war to 1939-19^5 patl il as a lack of
Strong leadership (such as might have been under Churchill) Lo
critically affect Britain's return to military power. Simp'/ stated,
to the brink of war, Britain had inadequate for i th insufficii
equipment, poor leadership and minimal political guidance in a world
I










ahead. Germany was confidei
Bi i tain's words
,
, iy
supported by the io give it effect.
The: in Britain who decri The critics
appeasement have been mentioned b< chill, I ry, Dalton
and others. Too, there were military crii nly
called attention to tl or state of Britain's military
,
in-
novators in luetics and strategy, who sought to utili: vast
15
s wrought by the 20th Century technolog On :
were ; re notable exceptions.
Such men as Vice-Admi ral Si: F.C. Fuller,
Captain B. H. Liddel 1-Hart , Major-General i rick Sykes and
Mars';-"; oi .F. Viscount not to r,
but rather; as Liddel 1-Hart put it, to se< "technical i ty
rather than the quantity of fore which provic
guarantee of security. They strove severely
to alert the country to the danger as they saw i to
See Higham, Mi y Intel lee tun is and Johnson, D
Commi ttee (Lo iversity Pi I960).
B. H. Liddel 1-Hart, The Defense of Britain. (New Yc
Random House, 1935) , p. 2.




of the Secretai , or War, I js
a nominee for first Sea-Lord,
for fifteen \ nmand ; as CI
Staff. Yel wi political opposition to lent, tl en
d solu to defense prob The variety of tl
approaches weakened th i ngih of their arguments. The:
thing for everybody and, in the end, nothing fcr dy.
Higham, in asking why the armed services were neglected,
at six possibilities: (1) a failure i the
neglect of del est in 2) a great insi nee
upon orthodox finan d disarmament, (3) the lack of interest
by th ip in things foreign or in lectual, (4)
tional English distaste for unpleasant facts and basic theories,
(5) a growing belief in unp itated ; (6) the
nature of English public school educa I ced emphasis on
the classics and "gentlemanly pursuits" to Che n€ applied
1 R
science and gov it. He admits that possibilities are
"subtle and undef inable", but what they and other reason:- that
can be added meant was an "unwillingness to discuss that most un-







Whei . , , id is cuss w
turn ci : on what I feel to be 1
1
1-
ure to maintain an ad:. deterrent force, the fac
There is no arbitrary monetary fi at can ensure a nation's
security; this we know today. In the int years in in,
this was attempted with the ail too obvious results o1
rundown of the mil establishment. Higham accurately points o
that j "No one can study the Briti: oming
9 Q
aware of the all ; :g influence of the Ti iry." For
1 1 the Ti ury tfo . I igh wh i ch the C
exercised control over spending, but it was also the He.
t he Civil Se rv i ce . Th re ry M i n i s t ry fe i t 1 . in
two ways: fiscal control and the realizal Fu
1
21
in a ministry ' not its head, but r? er.
The Chancellors of tl I uer, 1 | rt, argued agaii
service demands from two aspects, the economic and th al. Ti
economic argument, framed in the government's desire for non-inter-










' econoi I st imu lated ai
22
: to su i t
as ountry wa: : I conv .ic
recove arti cv
'
. t trade m
too a proportion of economic i re dive io production
for the Services. in the econ rea, the gov reluct
to take action until after the war bcc^
The financial argi not n ly stated it: resist'
> ions to expenditures in light i
government extravagance had beer! . ible fo The .
;
' 1935, the supplies that tl all
tions could purchase were not large enough either to p
or prepare for war. The battle over final I until almosl
the eve of war. As Postan points out:
As late as 1938, Chancel 1 Exchequer,
S i r John S i rnon , i n re s i s t i ng i ms of
the Services, found it necess; s that
expenditure could reach a limit ! which it
might defeat the very pur| nt.
Finance, he argued, was one of Britain's military
sources: something in the r of a foui
arm. Britain could not hope to match an •: sor
in a lightning war, and her cl of v i
rested on her ability to withstand the financial
stresses of a long war. To overtax her fin-
resources and to undermine her financial stability
for the sake of military preparedness might
22





-,>pard i se I ry abi 1 i ty tc
A ma ment of 19th century ly
appropriate in the face of Hi tier J Si lain
before him, paid lip set vice to nati<
Both men fought continous rearguard actions against the demands of
the services. Within limits they ga\ , but
the most stringent limits possible, limits
least three years after the acceptance of re nt pro,'
supply and the prepare of industry for wartime munitions produ
ti on.
Thus, we have se< - of the factors nt,
d defense policy and ly for:' . To
these --the slowness of reai nt, the braking actions o1 I
Tresury, the weaknesses in the Defense White Papers, politics-- must
be added • r> : people and perse
It was suggested earlier that public d disai
Baldwin, as i, was troubled over b ; at
25
Fulham. He could not have helped being even more in by the
Ibid .
,
p. '3. There is aiother facet to the ecc question.
British planners thought of the e ;onomy as a fourth "arm11 of deterrence,
As late as March 1939, documents capons
against Hitler., feeling that Hitl :> collapse




25 Parl. D , Vol.317, col Wkk, 11 November 19:

Pe.
i ight pe i t revealed pth of
of disarm The
red o1
the af1 ; and a half mi '! 1 :
26
Br i tons who voti
within a year, the signinc of an Anglo- val
Agreement --< a which had seemed ei i :s i b 1 e in 19;
'
brought about worried letl The
magnitude of the at fro, . >ing obvious to all
but 1 he most av 35. G
acceptance of n lent and a strongei e.
Pc.
,
i ties we 1 e slower ch
of appeasement, limited liability , a sma , and stri
heir making. Mention has been made all
group of mi lit >st other civilian pel I i ties
that helped shape British defense policy in the 1 ~e
also active in foreign policy. Neville Ch lain as Chancellor of
the Exchequer and Prime Minister is wall-known. His succe: r at
the Treasury, Sir John Simon, continued Chamberlain's policy of a
?6
Viscount Cecil (Lord Robert Cecil), A Great f:
(New York: Oxford University Press, 13^1), pp. <\
L

'tight control of defensi until .
alii . its own i n
g ; ~> • ; I this,
onal friend of Ch. . possibly wi
Horace Wi 1 soi
The other numbers of the "inner" Cabinet --Sir Samuel Hoa.
Lord Hal if -e equally influ Hoare was
a strong supportei t as was ; the \i
moved away Fi it right support aftei Still, it
"inner"
first heard when questions of foreiy: : polk
Beyon "i Cabinet tl in
government who played major roles in defense policy ;y can
Lioned in a paragraph: Duff Cc tii
ich, Leslie [lore- Bel i sha at the War Offi nt and
Kings ley Wood at the Air Ministry. To the Sir
Thomas lnskip_,who first headed the Ministry for Co-oi ;
Defense until replaced in early 1933 by Lord Chatfield.
Outside of government one name stands out: W 11.
But though his role in the Opposition is clear, it r to a




Cooper, the persons closest te
to enc< e and instill £ s pol i(
As I '! lor of the
'
tri
27defen: i n for rearmament. Bui
bus!' approach, and one cant.: if as C .lor
he g d the enoi problem of it.
I n s k i p , the M i n i s te
i
to stave off a Ministry of one of Supply,
was best a cipher. In a job that should
ing point for the ii ion of military policy into I
i attempt merely k
together; a I goal, but far short of tl
The Services th '.ves had, for the ;
vigorously engaged in turning the clock as
with the limited funds available, some qual
have been made, but generally was not. By irly thirti iost
28
usable war stocks had been consum
hampered t that the deficiencies so
great that the bulk of early production had to g bring










the deficiencies of Briti
thci
.is at las;
had so long obscu the threat fi i-
tional year foi nse policy and i
1 moves to reai i, it can
o nity of the threat i he problem
:




n t pro;, re i nforc< ;e
.
was to back up di| I tic efforts with a show o
ss would-be ; sors while i1 ti
dottiest i c
es was ' calls a ; -l
strength impressive on par ut not nee
|
" / or rest, Only
the R.A.F. adopt Scheme F with a view ti
Indeed it was not until 1.938 that re<
fear of con took on special ui il
spring of 1333 that the plans of the Governmenl






•e seen that I
took an intei
his interest did Prii
h ist i .is ' view can s'i
admitted the t: much
, !
cannot agt ee wi th I t "it i
not so mu h the Pi ' s gra: :
....it; ion 1 s) i I i ty to
It was the d
of the 1
But clearly the do this.
I not c they
problem or th I -y engaged in Ei
pie. As there is no evidence to
ms open to quest i c
sfense pel icy i s, at
i i berlain, as the hea ical leadership, was











C; bi net . The Cabinet was 1
t was pol i
t







constantly changing internatioi 1 situ i. The
in Briti was not in attempting to id a pi
but ra ther in for 1 ches o
ling in an "expansion" c.
plan, i I imi ted in
anquility, caused defense policy to miri nation
thus ensui credible deti t . Lon 1
pi
i
as Higham points out, "...
a failure to allow six years, at least, for the n
able force i r> time to challenge."
Higham further states, and the stati
"for the first two-thirds of the interwar years
to understand the increasing time lag between d for
35
and delivering onto the battlefield of modern weapons." ' Fin
34 ,






: i, rearming .
, had the intentio
shou lei I , i
years furth
place : t plec
Chan ber lain to ul t
i
"late in this dangerous day."" is t!
dangerousnes? day had I 1 by Ci
If at the Treasury. Well I t in a
that "in the ' o" anv ] ally and until c
com I .- 1 d, we must : ; iu fore i gn
;
t was unsaid
due to his avoidance of alii ana
The passage is valuable too for it si
had indeed, by early 1938, become a function of the very in;
ate of defense. From now on, Chamberlain • ild
have to "beer with pati id good hui . : - ions uld
39
like to t in very different fashion."
-, /
develops this idea furtl er VII)
and goes into details as to Service defici.
measures undertaken to remedy th.





On March 7 I
and annexation of Austria, CI
White . to Commons. Ag<
referr i ng to his own 1 ' 1 -
ing economic si , / "a powerful d it age
hedged on Ms of the paper, in particular to
i o'e par i ty in f i rst 1 i
any Europe;: ail force within
the pol icy for \
, ii importance was national security, f< > preservatio
of trade routes. Third cai^e c\<
ration in the de ial British n in oi
and, in fact, by 19.38 was probably ii The
and trade routes dr. d heavily en th
that just before World V;ar One, but <. so [-\j'
R.A.F. or Army. If pr the country
of CI r la? n' s pol icy, his mean
by 1938, h parity with 3vy.
41
42





wel 1 in '
behi nd tl I not unLi ; L
f i nanc i a 1 cl
d i o a concept of
aircraft would i •< in coming, leavii
a i r uml >re 1 la.
Inca| of f i 1 1 f n i
cond, third or fourth objec polk
-nuld even
defens : it i -a i rcr Ft defense at I
'•Air I ie of B
rest of the Army I jr.
nd against the Lul
in Germany.
Thus from the beginning, Chamb
in the g< could not be adequately suppoi ces.





p. 18. That is to
si on was i w li only by industry avai
the industrial pd 1 available was li the pi rich was
almost immed iately ! t
.
kh
At about this same time, the Foren
the Mi n . ordinat if
duct ion n i itish i rch
1938). Jo id., p. 31. -'• 98 mi for Air Defei on







sy ai rcra ,-ge c i
Ion in particular. But as P<
the crisis b< ' I, the: hesit.
fortunately momentary. I mi
the I of of this I
armament again made their app e in high qi s."
n Chamber I
reality. : gone to Munich, we ai
i the Governments of which he had of
interwar ye ich since ; : . of
ancellor of the Exchequer in 1931 he ' -.ere is influ
in defense affairs had dangerou his time by
heir failure to provide a proper air umbrella." When he returned
to Munich his worst fears v.ere reali'2 id a subse vey of
48deficiencies showed them to be even greater than the public ed.
45 .












<ures from plan or,
outbreak of war. i < ,
now in pre; n for .
to an ,
The d< te over the value of the ye;
agreements is s t sugg
i n a i r ca pab i 1 i ty . Th i s wou 1 cl i ca 1 g i ven CI i i ' s
50
rl ier pr i or i Be
'
the R.A.F, expanded its Spitfire and I
Put the official his iai r produ , a 1th
cl ', th( in tactical air strength, states "..
ivalent of tl eway made up cannot be
51 -
acci . ." benefitted from three additi
being rated as fully-equipped, thus bringing to five





















What was lost in too.
Thirty-six Czech division
c 1 a i 1
1
•
the search for i
ther the gain
! ie value of a yc
Britain 1 r and industrial pote war;
jch from what was c\o<\>^ in th
greater length ne in which | ready
52
.in could gaii n."
Nov,/ defense pol ic . truly the r of foreign po
re
i
gn pol icy wi it power had proved futil





merci ful ly , e ' that
Why , in the
could ade ly serve its of mail
of a jusl i on the con:
mode: lack of will to re a i i-
i
it relu nee to interven of
pubi i c opi !• ion,
b 1 atant u <y
takes so. y list
ing Lutl
and is, perhaps, the i lying cruse for the fail
( .-fense pel icy tl uld hav I i
lies i :
Ideally, defense and foreign
of strategy. It is for policy to I ; eved '
strategy: thus strc its of defen
policy into an integrated one. The Twentieth Century has been cal
the C • of Total War: that is, where war is carried ou il
f ields--po! i t ical
,
military, d ; j' economic.
token, trie policies th; t s ace must ;
i interacl tween defense i only
l< | ical f but necessary, linked as are mountain cl
i
being no more ii • tant than he v .hors. .

In the ru r in 1919, E
con ntly forg
i i
offer a coun terpo to his mi 1 it;
f: ee hai 1 unti 1 last poss i tain'
s
. n po i i
.
What sort < hard to
say, perl rd as it i cri tici ze.
- to E wi th t!
that , tl had 1 obj ec t:
it.
"The Engl system," Fn
have said. Pei interwar year
.tied on one, as technology voided fo the empiric .h
to foreign policy. That they did not cannot be held s
blame of Chamberlai :
;
cr ever. Baldwin before him. Here
nation must tale • of the blame.
53











] e a d i : r 5 ' i i p. Th
cannot produce
survival
But the English pei it was
ee,
or I it. They had be
let down by the ir pol i t ical 1 11 too t ioned
unti 1 i t
I f a nation is r , i t mu r :
the woi ' ies. To
policies, particularly ci d foreign . .of
a strategical framework
Brit.! i ire to r'ecid. a strategy early
. cond to a s 1 ot
neglect. This in ti ed for
tion v L 1 icies r is is si Even
a potentially viable policy, i
ability to temper justice with force. ' t was at last decid
to add the Factor of force to the foreign policy ion, i





. lag be tween i ncepl i on
British;.'
i t lacked a ere nt
because it failed to realize, in
World War One, I ace ha i
•_>nse canni i I unt i 1 is




pi t . If
,
i n the long
goals as outlined in
1 ikely to incui il ti or
so. The price o ar stal is, a . ith-
out it. ign pol ic> i Le
but it less . As Sr a
much greater extent that in any other great country
our military strength to so low a point tl -re v/as no effective
support For our foreign policy. No British Foreign Sec
to succeed when other governments had be r
L










"Of course the d i ff icu
'




unlikely to succeed. n cf s
; a few Foreign Office do
ra i loble and I neral
,
scholc rounding events ii s.
But historic >ntinue
suggests th< ti 11 a variety of 1 - be 1
the story, modest student ci
ma in cot curr ii
t ime" and I
now fami
the effectiveness arrativ
allowed for th< ex< -.ism o1 >s of t
was still bad, but on s< ys app
was still wrong, but . ives seem to have left i ice.




I n th i
stand mdl s ted i n tl
i
ions oi the (
cc nt to her traditioi r. Too,
foreign policy d im. It 1 in-
ternal problems, mostly the rigid e
The three aspects i
central ers of this e:
•, 1 i ke a col I
many sources. Certainly it is i
pol icy in the lal i in.
It is Chamberlain who seems to un pects unde
his personal diplomacy a Hitler 1
.
:
> i 'ol of f in
the vitc : of Anglo-Gerr to
appeas< i t that ingly hindered Bri it.
Yet each aspect transcends Ch his i
belief system so strong that no one dared
personal diplomacy? 1 of fc
pol icy tl nc >uld stand agai i
a I policy that altern; were





i il ion from the
real itfe*
isolation was to Sc
re-occupat ion of tl and in 10.
st? I t i s a very
a vol id In term s of B
led , i t
re i nadequate
in foreign affairs and th
not he
onjec.1 u re thai ill psi
have been worse than no res| t all. In 1
still have i or Britain as a mil to
guard t. ion.
Would th sacr i
i Leag^:
!
ve securi a in, tl is
elusive, but it
I
Of which Arthur Cadogan minuted in 1339: "This f,
:
. soon di« o I illation", a comment I 3tely
reflected Foreign Office opinion after Eden's do;





1 1 o I
And, c
sought to
The options open to British pol i<
of i' i ther b
ence seem, i n i
ment in Ch n's fc policy i •: :
opened his eyes to th
is pel i cy
due i n <
Hitler'
of the conduct of
Foreign 01 D m ing St. I
t icul ar it served to i
w and to neutralize the ant i-appeasers. Still at 10 Do
St. ility of a fo is in power
med to be vague , rehended, though the most
2
nt a return to alii dista: ircle.
Fe i 1 i ng , Chan.berlain , pp. 3^+ 1—2
L

If n pol icy :
i ty, h I i tary. It'
in's eci





"Bra^ no parsnips"."' Ai
1
it \ sn it carne to economic tl zis. Power
me.-- nt, plainly, n, as v
litl rength until very I /. This at




: al 1 too clear.
At about th an to
nesseSj Ives awaken sorry
mi 1 ? tary estabi i shment. From the
a race b« : :pansionist d
,
m and the re :
of British military strength to a degre :ely to suppc
France and. ter, to carry th
Thus of the three aspects of British foreign
•
-CI mberlain as a diplomat, the conflict be: i.he
Prime Minister arid the Foreign Office and the i rite re' of







• i ng the si i c
C h. a i n d i d no
t
i p
to Ri y of 1939 • The re \ inly 01
Anglo-
of 1
to al low him sti 1
1
In'
I month or so of
nowhere in th < on
t a bold personal ini* i ht snat of
ii of 1 933 •




it could be said not to in tl
sense, as has been noted, that the critica of the ict
of Anglo-German af1 : removed to No. 10 D 3t.
Throughout tl ion in the Fo
:d madly, but they were isolati
From i • |n Off ice cc;




,pi-i 1 1339 "7 id that
he had crust of I had no c<








state s y s t e m
.
ge from tl
So i r coul
p {'::'< t j i 1 v in
in 1
mi ght wel 1 h
unknown
As the web of I
to b< - report , covei
recounts i
its, ral I ". . . th
i s 1 i tt 1




'$. 3 March I
Van-:
'
d ict inc; war i





F '5V18, 31 March 1939- See also F.C

reflected i n an Api M
, 193!
the ;h que
d i 1 en
lid aside and confirm him in "?
logan's co
at Prague --ind befon at Bri'




J long ago confirmed him in . Still; it is
a j a refit ion of Foreign Office thinking
hi le Britain's mov'.
ntum. The "Ei
gn i zed that "i i »
|
,
act i< r passi I", whi
Apr' ! . ill be seen that our 6




. lave validity in that any
gains \ I enhance Britain's ability to go over to the o that
much so ..." an almost f( le conclusion in the view
I22/5V18, 7 April 193!




E>1 Lh ciet ic
If thi s was so an<
i
:
policy after Prague. Perhaps, a1 all, tl
a band cm. Yet the d i
1
galvanizing of direction ieral aii is
o'bvious to the i i of Fo Of Pic:
One thing seems clear: Prague C' e air. Only th
of na i / res i dur
gua? . icy. Th on
i
of peace, British policy was much
.As
... there was ...
choice,
wi th ( its reck
of pt I i tary pi pol ic
-•as one might ha early
thought out . '
1
might be added iewal in c
Britain's mil I strength. The rearmament programs, ially the
R.A.F., were beginning to hie full stride in some ar
10
A confusion due in part is to ontrol of
the conduct of Anglo-German affairs was out of the For<
11







no longer so as to •
sp
sense it reflected
Br i tain, as her mi 1 itary strength i to pre




determ ion to res is
policy.. .:"... m
on with . .
"
Clearly, thei re con
but the- i in could enuncial of re.
force \r.(' Yet i
was al 1 too more t le
deterrent. In the interim, on 1 to t:
would continue to be made.
12
Arnold Toynbee and V a Toynbee, eds.
onal Affair- S, Vol. 1C
-r6 Univ. Pre
,
p. 204. 1 r a
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t i on I aggress i on was i








ii: ige. He could not
the fc ment, slew as. i t of
greates jer. Pei haps he
'^Woodward " Reflections... 193'
. N, Medl icott,

of •
not If at Muni
;i ti sh
/ spring.
on both the righl
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